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ARTICLE
MITIGATIONS: THE FORGOTTEN SIDE OF THE
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
PAUL H. ROBINSON*
ABSTRACT
In the first change to the Model Penal Code since its promulgation in 1962,
the American Law Institute in 2017 set blameworthiness proportionality as the
dominant distributive principle for criminal punishment. Empirical studies sug-
gest that this is in fact the principle that ordinary people use in assessing proper
punishment. Its adoption as the governing distributive principle makes good
sense because it promotes not only the classic desert retributivism of moral phi-
losophers, but also crime-control utilitarianism. It accomplishes the latter by
enhancing the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community and thereby
promoting deference, compliance, acquiescence, and internalization of its
norms, rather than suffering the resistance and subversion that is provoked by
perceived violations of blameworthiness proportionality.
Such a principle has been commonly used as the basis for criticizing im-
proper aggravations, such as the doctrines of felony murder and “three strikes,”
but the principle also logically requires recognizing a full range of deserved
mitigations, not as a matter of grace or forgiveness but as a matter of entitle-
ment. And given ordinary people’s nuanced judgments about blameworthiness
proportionality, maintaining moral credibility with the community requires that
the criminal law adopt an equally nuanced system of mitigations.
Such a nuanced system ideally would include reform of a wide variety of
current law doctrines and, especially in the absence of such specific reforms,
adoption of a general mitigation provision that aims for blameworthiness pro-
portionality in all cases. Such a general mitigation ought not be limited to cases
of “heat of passion” or murder, as today’s liability rules commonly provide.
Rather, it ought to be available whenever the offense circumstances and the
offender’s situation and capacities meaningfully reduce the offender’s blamewor-
thiness, as long as giving the mitigation does not specially undermine commu-
nity norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) introduced its first
amendment to the Model Penal Code since its promulgation in 1962—drop-
ping the laundry list of alternative distributive principles for punishment in
favor of a provision that gives clear dominance to desert, which requires
punishment in proportion to an actor’s moral blameworthiness. This desert
assessment is meant to take into account a rich array of factors including the
seriousness of the offense, the actor’s culpable state of mind at the time of
the offense, as well as his or her objective situation and personal capacities.
In assessing punishments under the new provision, officials must render
punishment “proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to
crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.”1 Alternative distribu-
tive principles, such as those of general deterrence and incapacitation of the
1
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) sets desert as
the dominant distributive principle that can never be violated:
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dangerous, are given an inferior status: they may be relied upon in determin-
ing the method of punishment, for example, but can never be used in a way
that violates the dominant principle of blameworthiness proportionality.
Such non-desert goals may be pursued only “within the boundaries of pro-
portionality in subsection (a)(i) [quoted above].”
Criminal law scholarship has commonly seen discussions of the value
of a “proportionality” principle, but frequently, the principle has been taken
to mean punishment in proportion to the seriousness of the offense rather
than the overall blameworthiness of the offender. One famous writer, for
example, describes “the principle of proportionality—that is, the require-
ment that sanctions be proportionate in their severity to the seriousness of
offenses.”2 Under the Model Penal Code amendment, however, reference to
the “proportionality” principle is understood as a reference to blameworthi-
ness proportionality rather than to harm proportionality.
This dramatic shift in the Model Penal Code’s distributive principle for
punishment makes good sense. It appeals to traditional retributivists, who
see justice as a value in itself that requires no additional utilitarian justifica-
tion. (But notice that the Model Penal Code’s language specifically rejects
the view of those retributivists who would give no significance to resulting
harm.)3
(2) The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official
actors in the sentencing system, are:
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders:
(i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportion-
ate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blame-
worthiness of offenders;
(ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation, general
deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, and restitution to crime vic-
tims, preservation of families, and reintegration of offenders into the law-
abiding community, provided these goals are pursued within the boundaries of
proportionality in subsection (a)(i); . . . .
(emphasis added).
2 Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST.
55, 56 (1992); see also R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 135
(2003) (“Penal proportionality, as orthodoxly understood, is a relation between the seriousness
of the crime and the severity of the punishment.”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE
CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 169 (1985)
(“Penalties should comport with the seriousness of crimes, so that the reprobation visited on
the offender through his penalty fairly reflects the blameworthiness of his conduct.”); Douglas
N. Husak, Already Punished Enough, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 83 (1990) (“A corollary of the ‘just
deserts’ theory is the principle of proportionality, according to which the severity of a punish-
ment should be a function of the seriousness of the offense.”).
3 E.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 33 (1970); HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 423 (1979); Lawrence C.
Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262,
267–76 (1974); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw,
84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 679, 684–95 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punish-
ment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 1497 (1974). In the view of such desert scholars, resulting harm does not alter an actor’s
blameworthiness; it is principally his culpability and capacities that determine his blame. By
having the provision explicitly reference not only the offender’s blameworthiness, but also the
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But, the amendment giving dominance to desert also appeals to many
crime-control utilitarians who have seen increasing evidence that commit-
ting the criminal law to a principle of just punishment, no more and no less,
effectively fights crime. A criminal law that is careful to do justice and avoid
injustice will build the law’s moral credibility with the community and
thereby enable it to harness the powerful forces of social influence and the
internalization of the law’s norms.4 Social psychologists have confirmed the
anecdotal evidence with controlled studies: a criminal justice system seen as
regularly tolerating injustice and failures of justice is a system that will in-
spire resistance and subversion, while a system that earns moral credibility
with the community is more likely to generate deference, compliance, and
the internalization of the criminal law’s norms.5
Part II gives more detail on the blameworthiness proportionality princi-
ple, and Part III discusses its adoption in the recent Model Penal Code
amendment. Current law’s treatment of mitigations conflicts with blamewor-
thiness proportionality in a variety of ways. Part IV provides a conceptual
overview of these conflicts. To avoid them, the law should recognize a gen-
eral mitigation doctrine, as argued in Part V. Part VI describes the underly-
ing theory of such a general mitigation provision, and Part VII proposes
specific codification language.
II. BLAMEWORTHINESS PROPORTIONALITY AND DESERVED MITIGATION
The long-running scholarship on retributivist desert has continuously
made clear how nuanced blameworthiness analysis can be. More recently,
empirical studies have demonstrated that it is not just desert theorists who
think in nuanced desert terms, but also ordinary people. People’s shared
judgments of justice—what has been called “empirical desert,” as compared
to the “deontological desert” of moral philosophers—are also terribly
nuanced and complex.6 And yet, enormous agreement persists on the basic
principles of justice across demographics.7 The studies show that people’s
judgments of proper punishment track a principle of desert,8 in particular the
gravity and harm of the offense, the language of the Model Penal Code’s amendment fore-
closes the debate on whether resulting harm is to be given significance.
4
PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUN-
ISHED AND HOW MUCH 175–89 (2008) [hereinafter DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES]; PAUL H.
ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 152–63 (2013) [hereinafter
IJUD].
5 See DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 175–89; IJUD, supra note 4, at 152–63.
6 For some examples of how nuanced people’s judgments of justice are on a very wide
range of criminal liability and punishment issues, see IJUD, supra note 4, at 239–400.
7 Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1848–65 (2007) [hereinafter Concordance].
8 Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deter-
rence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284,
288–95 (2002); John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and
Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676–79 (2000).
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principle of blameworthiness proportionality, in which cases of greater
blameworthiness deserve more punishment than cases of lesser blamewor-
thiness. This rank-ordering demand of blameworthiness proportionality gen-
erates hundreds, if not thousands, of importantly different degrees of
blameworthiness and, hence, differences in deserved punishment.9
Given the enormous amount of nuance in both empirical and deonto-
logical desert for blameworthiness proportionality, it follows that the propor-
tionality principle requires that legal rules reflect not only deserved
aggravations, but also deserved mitigations. That is, the principle of blame-
worthiness proportionality can be as easily offended by the system’s failure
to give a deserved mitigation as it is offended by the system failing to give a
deserved aggravation. A criminal law that seeks to do justice and to be seen
as doing justice must be as careful to provide appropriate mitigations as
aggravations, and not as a matter of grace or forgiveness but as a matter of
entitlement.
If the criminal law is to earn moral credibility with the community, it
must recognize a set of mitigations that is as nuanced as the community’s
judgments. That will require a good deal of doctrinal sophistication. The
empirical studies make clear that people’s judgments of justice are not just
vague feelings but rather specific demands. Indeed, the number of meaning-
fully different degrees of blameworthiness exceeds the number of meaning-
fully different punishment amounts along the punishment continuum. This
comes from the fact that the number of meaningfully different punishments
on the punishment continuum is considerably fewer than one might think.
As the amount of punishment increases, so too does the difference in punish-
ment required to make two punishments meaningfully different. Punish-
ments of five days and seven days are meaningfully different from one
another, but punishments of a year and a year and two days are not.10
While the principle of blameworthiness proportionality operates as an
ordinal-ranking mechanism, it ultimately generates a specific amount of
punishment for each case. It is not that there is a special connection between
the facts of a particular case and the resulting amount of punishment de-
served. The specific amount of punishment deserved is that amount that puts
the offender in his or her appropriate ordinal rank among all others. If the
endpoint of the punishment continuum were changed, for example by shift-
ing it from the death penalty to a maximum of twenty-five years imprison-
ment, then all cases would need to have their assigned punishments shifted
down on the punishment continuum accordingly.11
This suggests, then, that criminal law doctrine requires the recognition
of mitigations that will be at least as nuanced as its system of aggravations.
9 See IJUD, supra note 4, at 23–34.
10
PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS & LEPERS: LESSONS
FROM LIFE OUTSIDE THE LAW 100 (2015) [hereinafter PIRATES]; IJUD, supra note 4, at 11.
11 See DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 141; PIRATES, supra note 10, at 100.
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That is, it ought to provide offense grade reductions for mitigations just as it
provides offense grade increases for aggravations. And it ought to have
some mechanism for more minor adjustments within an offense grade for
less consequential mitigations just as it has more minor adjustments within
an offense grade for less consequential aggravations, commonly through
sentencing guidelines or other mechanisms for directing the exercise of dis-
cretion by sentencing judges.12
III. THE ILL-FITTING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM
One might see the Model Penal Code amendment as a historic step
forward, perhaps providing the basis for a truce in the long-running feud
between desert retributivists and crime-control utilitarians. A criminal law
built upon a distributive principle of desert, in particular empirical desert,
can provide what may be the best practical approximation of deontological
desert for retributivists and at the same time provide crime-control effective-
ness for utilitarians by enhancing the criminal law’s moral credibility with
the community.13
But before there is too much celebration, one must deal with the some-
what problematic legislative history of the Model Penal Code amendment. In
their work on the amendment, the drafters were influenced by the notion of
“limiting retributivism,” which saw desert as only excluding certain ex-
tremes of excessive or insufficient punishment.14 This apparent legislative
history is complicating because this variation on retributivism does not sup-
port a principle of blameworthiness proportionality.
“Morris [the champion of limiting retributivism] freely admits that his
theory allows equally blameworthy defendants to receive unequal degrees of
severity and thus permits the more blameworthy to receive less punish-
ment.”15 This would seem to violate the very point of the Model Penal Code
amendment, which on its face expressly requires proportionality and seeks to
12 For example, the general mitigation provision proposed in Part VI.A. gives a jury the
power to direct the sentencing judge to provide a mitigation (that has an effect less than a
reduction of an offense grade).
13 A criminal law that conflicts with community views will provoke resistance and subver-
sion, while a criminal law that tracks community views will inspire deference, compliance, and
internalization of its norms. See IJUD, supra note 4, at 141–75.
14
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
15 Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363,
385 (1997). Frase goes on to argue on Morris’s behalf that “such ‘failures’ of ordinal propor-
tionality are not necessarily either substantial in degree or routine.” Id. For a contrary view—
that ordinal-ranking failures are substantial and routine under limiting retributivism—see An-
drew von Hirsch, Proportionality and Parsimony in American Sentencing Guidelines: The
Minnesota and Oregon Standards, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 149, 163–64 (Rod
Morgan & Chris Clarkson eds., 1995); Andrew von Hirsch, Equality, ‘Anisonomy,’ and Jus-
tice: A Review of Madness and the Criminal Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1102–03 (1984);
Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55,
76 (1992); Andrew von Hirsch, Sentencing Guidelines and Penal Aims in Minnesota, 13 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 39, 45 (1994).
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prohibit the doing of injustice to advance some general deterrence or inca-
pacitation purpose.
A further unfortunate implication of reliance upon the limiting retribu-
tivist conception of desert is that it would be at best indifferent to recogniz-
ing a full system of deserved mitigations. If one were to follow limiting
retributivism’s demand that we concern ourselves only with instances of
gross disproportionality, we would have every reason to ignore issues of
deserved mitigation. Mitigations simply do not concern the issue of liability-
vs-no-liability, but instead relate only to adjustments to the degrees of pun-
ishment. And these adjustments often concern only whether liability should
be reduced an offense grade or less. While a blameworthiness proportional-
ity principle seeks to carefully match the degree of punishment to the degree
of blameworthiness, limiting retributivism is only interested in avoiding in-
stances of gross disproportionality.16
Also problematic is the fact that limiting retributivism simply does not
match the principles of justice held by ordinary people. The empirical stud-
ies make clear that people are committed to a principle of blameworthiness
proportionality.17 Their judgments of justice do not simply concern avoiding
gross disproportionality, but rather are nuanced and sophisticated across the
entire continuum of punishment.18 While Norval Morris might be willing to
tolerate greater punishment for the less blameworthy, ordinary people would
not. They would see this as an injustice that would undermine the criminal
law’s moral credibility and reduce their willingness to comply, defer, acqui-
esce, and internalize the criminal law’s norms.19
The good news is that the drafters’ interest in limiting retributivism does
not show on the face of the amendment. Indeed, the amendment explicitly
insists on “proportionality” rather than simply “avoiding gross dispropor-
tionality.” Nor does the amendment suggest that the desert ranges be broad.
If the provision had used the term “desert,” for example, one might argue
that this term should be given the somewhat contorted meaning of limiting
retributivism. But, there is nothing in the provision’s terms of “blameworthi-
ness” or “proportionality” that leaves room for any such ambiguity. The
drafters’ discussion of their interest in limiting retributivism may be interest-
ing intellectual history that perhaps explains what initially piqued their inter-
est in desert as a distributive principle. That said, the amendment they have
16 See NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 151 (1982) (suggesting that
the proportionality ranges under limiting retributivism have to be broad).
17 See Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish?
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
284, 295–97 (2002); John Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation
and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676-79 (2000); Paul
H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1940, 1961–67 (2010) [hereinafter The Disutility of Injustice].
18 See Concordance, supra note 7, at 1832–46; The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 17,
at 1989.
19 See The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 17, at 1995–97.
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adopted is unambiguous in its commitment to blameworthiness proportional-
ity and in its failure to carry forward the anti-proportionality and anti-mitiga-
tion aspects of limiting retributivism.20
IV. POINTS OF LAW-COMMUNITY CONFLICT ON DESERVED MITIGATIONS
AND THE REACTIONS THEY INSPIRE
To what extent does current law deviate from the principle of blame-
worthiness proportionality? The literature about the rules and doctrines that
violate the blameworthiness principle through improper aggravation of lia-
bility and punishment is enormous. Indeed, these are often the favorite topics
of modern criminal law academics: the felony murder rule, three-strikes ha-
bitual offender statutes, the criminalization of regulatory offenses, the use of
strict liability, high penalties for drug offenses, and others.21
Less systematically studied, however, is the general failure of current
criminal law to take seriously its obligation to recognize mitigations that
reduce the offense grade of liability and the extent of punishment. The prin-
ciple of blameworthiness proportionality requires not only that the legal
rules reflect deserved aggravations, but just as importantly, that they reflect
deserved mitigations, and not as a matter of grace or forgiveness but as a
matter of entitlement.
There exists a wide variety of cases in which criminal law’s liability and
punishment rules generate results that conflict with deserved mitigation. The
conflicts occur in both directions: the law frequently fails to provide a miti-
gation that is deserved and occasionally provides a mitigation that is not
deserved.22
A. Deserved Mitigation Conflict Points
As the quadrant graphic below suggests, the community might think
that a significant mitigation is appropriate, yet the law gives little or none
(upper left-hand quadrant); thus, the case is seen as an instance of unjust
punishment. Or, less commonly, the community may see no basis for a miti-
gation, yet the law gives one anyway (lower right-hand quadrant), a case that
20 As I have argued elsewhere, in practice, the Report’s proposal will operate like a classic
desert distributive principle. See Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Princi-
ple of “Limiting Retributivism”: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other Than Pure Desert?,
7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 12–13 (2003). The only open issue is whether the resulting distribu-
tion of punishment is more likely to match deontological desert or empirical desert.
21 For empirical confirmation that these crime-control doctrines conflict with ordinary
people’s judgments of justice, see, for example, IJUD, supra note 4, at 120–28.
22 This Part provides many illustrative cases in part because these same cases are com-
monly used in later Parts of this Article to develop and test various aspects of a proposed
general mitigation provision. Such a provision ought to provide a mitigation in situations
where empirical desert supports a mitigation and ought to deny a mitigation where empirical
desert does not.
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is seen as a failure of justice. Of course, the community and the law can
sometimes agree that a significant mitigation is appropriate (upper right-
hand quadrant) or that no mitigation is appropriate (lower left-hand
quadrant).
GRAPHIC 1. MITIGATION CONFLICT POINTS
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\HLL103.txt unknown Seq: 10  6-JAN-20 15:17
228 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 57
1. Conflict Cases: Instances of Injustice
Instances of Conflict-Injustice (upper-left hand quadrant) include cases
like that of John Gounagias. In a small predominantly Greek community, the
defendant, while immobilized in a drunken state, is forcibly sodomized by a
companion who then spreads news of the rape in order to humiliate
Gounagias. He is then mercilessly taunted within the tight community and
becomes increasingly angry and desperate. After one particularly humiliat-
ing public taunting at the local bar, Gounagias goes home, gets his gun,
storms to his victimizer’s house, and shoots him dead. Despite the fact that
his killing is clearly in a heat of passion provoked by the conduct of the
person he shoots, no provocation mitigation is available to him. The forcible
rape and taunting are ignored—not even admissible at trial—and
Gounagias’s killing is treated as indistinguishable from the standard inten-
tional killing without provocation. He is convicted of murder in the first
degree, sentenced to fifteen-years-to-life at hard labor, and dies in prison.23
This is not an unusual case by a rogue judge, but rather a standard
application of the common law provocation rules. Gounagias is ineligible for
the mitigation from murder to manslaughter because “cooling time” has
passed since the original rape and because the immediate trigger, the latest
taunting at the local pub, is legally ineligible as a basis for the provocation
mitigation.24 Clearly Gounagias deserves punishment for what he has done,
but is the earlier rape irrelevant in assessing the proper degree of his
punishment?
Brian Randolph is a twenty-three-year-old father of a baby daughter
who has cancer. The cancer treatments are going well, and there appears to
be a future for the little girl. But then Randolph’s insurance runs out. Seeing
no other way to get his daughter treatment, Randolph robs a bank by passing
a note with no display of a weapon. With the proceeds from the robbery, the
baby is soon back on her treatments. Randolph is charged with bank robbery
and, getting no mitigation, is sentenced to a maximum of twenty-five years.25
While there is no issue of provocation of course, the case might argua-
bly be one in which the actor performed the offense under “extreme mental
23 State v. Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 305–07, 316–19 (1915).
24 See id. at 315–19; PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 538 (2d
ed. 2012).
25 Dave Bartkowiak Jr., Man Who Says He Robbed Bank to Pay for Daughter’s Cancer
Treatment Sent to Prison, CLICK 2 HOUS. (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.click2houston.com/
news/man-who-robbed-bank-to-help-pay-for-daughters-cancer-treatment-faces-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/S7ZA-E45S]; Laurie Hanna, Detroit Man Accused of Robbing Bank Says He
Was Desperate for Cash to Pay for Daughter’s Chemotherapy Treatment, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/man-tells-police-robbed-bank-
pay-daughter-chemo-therapy-article-1.2338826 [https://perma.cc/68GB-2TGZ]; Elahe Izadi,
Bank Robbery Suspect Said He Stole to Pay for Daughter’s Cancer Treatments, WASH. POST
(Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/27/bank-
robbery-suspect-said-he-stole-to-pay-for-daughters-cancer-treatments/?utm_term=.53d677cb
1277 [https://perma.cc/K5VM-QH42].
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or emotional disturbance,” which can be a basis for mitigation under the
Model Penal Code’s broader version of the common law provocation mitiga-
tion. But that broader formulation only applies to murder, not to bank rob-
bery. Further, the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance
mitigation has been rejected by most jurisdictions, even those otherwise
adopting the Model Penal Code.26 Isn’t Randolph’s motive at least relevant in
assessing his degree of blameworthiness for the bank robbery?
Keshia Dixon and her three daughters live with her boyfriend, Thomas
Wright, a convicted felon. When Dixon baulks at buying guns for Wright—
she is ineligible because she is currently under indictment for passing a bad
check—Wright threatens her daughters, and she ultimately agrees to make
the purchase. On the second occasion she buys weapons for Wright, Dixon
is arrested.
It may be that Dixon does not qualify for a full duress defense, but a
blameworthiness proportionality principle would insist that cases of “near
excuse” or “partial excuse” be given some acknowledgment. Coercion and
its effects exist on a continuum. To get the full defense of duress, the actor
must suffer coercion of a sort that “a person of reasonable firmness . . .
would have been unable to resist.”27 In a case where the extent of coercion
falls just short of that complete-defense point, are we to assume that the
coercive circumstances are irrelevant to assessing blameworthiness? Obvi-
ously not. Rather, an offender committing an offense under near-duress—or
any other disability near-excuse—ought to be seen as deserving a degree of
mitigation that matches the extent of the coercion. Instead, Dixon is sen-
tenced to almost three years in prison, the standard guideline sentence.28
Chad Gurney strangles his girlfriend, Zoe Sarnacki, and sets her body
on fire. When firefighters are called to an apartment fire, they find her char-
red body lying on a bed surrounded by several items including a crucifix, as
if part of some ritual. When he was younger, Gurney was in an accident that
left him with severe head injuries. After more than a dozen brain surgeries
and a dramatic shift in personality, he remains under the care of a psychia-
26
PAUL H. ROBINSON & TYLER S. WILLIAMS, MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: VARI-
ATIONS ACROSS THE 50 STATES 45–52 (2018) [hereinafter MAPPING].
27
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
28 Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006); United States v. Wright, No. 16-11010, 688
Fed. App’x. 262 (5th Cir. Apr. 27, 2017); United States v. Dixon, 413 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir.
2005); Brief for the United States at 2, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (No. 05-
7053); Note, Firearms Regulation—Defense of Duress, 120 HARV. L. REV. 322 (2006); Lyle
Denniston, Court to Hear Criminal Case on Duress Issue, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2006),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/01/court-to-hear-criminal-case-on-duress-issue. [https://per
ma.cc/2AZG-SVKR]; Gina Holland, Justices Weigh Abuse in Woman’s Defense, BALT. SUN
(Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/JusticesWeighAbuseinWomanDefense.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2MS5-WHVM]; Supreme Court to Hear Domestic Violence Case, FAM. VI-
OLENCE PREVENTION FUND: SPEAKING UP (Feb. 12, 2006), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/
SupremeCourtHearDVCase.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QDZ-8CT2]; Top Court Sides with Gov’t in
Duress Case, FOX NEWS (June 22, 2006), https://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/
2006Jun22/0,4675,ScotusDomesticAbuse,00.html [https://perma.cc/QQ3H-RM6N].
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trist and has a history of delusional episodes. He had not taken his medica-
tion on the day of the killing. In the prosecutor’s view, “People with mental
illness can appreciate right from wrong. They do all the time.”29 Gurney is
denied an insanity defense but also denied any mitigation and, upon convic-
tion for murder and arson, sentenced to sixty years.30
Given the many limitations on the insanity defense in the various
states,31 an offender like Gurney will commonly be denied a complete de-
fense. But, to the extent his mental illness played some significant role in the
commission of the offense, it would often tend to reduce his blameworthi-
ness as compared to a person committing the same offense with no such
mental illness. Yet, Gurney’s mental illness seems to be ignored in assessing
his degree of blameworthiness. If the court thought him dangerous, he could
have been civilly committed, but it is hard to see how the sentence takes full
account of the circumstances affecting his desert.
Shimeek Gridine, fourteen, is hanging out with a twelve-year-old friend
when they discover a small shotgun. A moment later, he asks a man walking
by to hand over his wallet. As the man just walks away, Gridine shoots at
him, and he is lightly wounded. Feeling remorseful, the boy goes to authori-
ties to confess to the shooting. Gridine is found guilty of premeditated at-
tempted murder and attempted armed robbery and sentenced to seventy and
twenty-five years, respectively, for the two offenses.32
In the United States, jurisdictions typically provide an immaturity de-
fense if and only if an offender is below a certain chronological age. And the
chronological age is trending lower.33 A side effect of this chronological-
age-cut-off approach is that a young adult tried in the adult criminal justice
29 Clarke Canfield, Appeal Rejected for Man Convicted of Decapitating Girlfriend, Setting
Her on Fire, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 7, 2012), https://bangordailynews.com/2012/02/07/
news/portland/appeal-rejected-for-man-convicted-of-decapitating-girlfriend-setting-her-on-
fire/ [https://perma.cc/E5DD-JY4R]; Crucifix Around Body, Chilling Details Suggest Ritual in
Portland Murder, FOSTERS (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www.fosters.com/article/20090925/NEWS
0104/909259986, [https://perma.cc/7ZVW-BPG5]; Slaying of Zoe Sarnacki: Chad Gurney
Told Police ‘A Monster’ Took Over, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2011), https://bangordaily
news.com/2011/01/12/news/slaying-of-zoe-sarnacki-chad-gurney-told-police-a-monster-took-
over/ [https://perma.cc/EY78-FTNK].
30 State v. Gurney, 36 A.3d 893 (Me. 2012); Canfield, supra note 29.
31 See MAPPING, supra note 26, 159–70.
32
OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ALL STATES ALLOW
JUVENILES TO BE TRIED AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
(June 2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/195420/page4.html [https://perma.cc/5WLS-
YEW5]; Erik Eckholm, Juveniles Facing Lifelong Terms Despite Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/us/juveniles-facing-lifelong-terms-despite-rul-
ings.html [https://perma.cc/S4YE-QG8D]; Clara McLaughlin, Boy 15, Gets 70 Years for At-
tempted Murder, FLA. STAR ONLINE (May 16, 2010), http://www.thefloridastar.com/boy-15-
gets-70-years-for-attempted-murder/ [https://perma.cc/4MZV-2JSR]. The Florida Supreme
Court subsequently held that the seventy-year sentence is like a life term without parole, which
cannot constitutionally be imposed upon a juvenile for a nonhomicide offense, thus requiring
that he be resentenced to something less than what would be effectively life without parole.
Gridine v. State, 175 So. 3d 672, 674–75 (Fla. 2015).
33 See MAPPING, supra note 26, at 171–78.
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system has no legal ability to raise a defense of immaturity or to assure that a
court will take account of his youthfulness. In other words, this is another
example of current law’s failure to recognize the need to take account of
“near excuses” by providing a mitigation where immaturity reduces but
does not extinguish blameworthiness, as the blameworthiness proportional-
ity principle requires.
Finally, consider the case of Dawn and Tony Shearer, who are divorced
but continue to live together in Ohio. There is a long history of domestic
abuse in their relationship. On this day, Tony is angry because Dawn intends
to go out. He chokes her unconscious. When Dawn regains consciousness,
she sees Tony’s gun on the table in front of her, which she assumes is there
because Tony intends to shoot her, so she picks up the weapon and shoots
Tony dead with a single shot. The prosecutor suggests that Dawn could have
done a variety of other things to avoid any further attack, including leaving
the house. Shearer is convicted of murder and sentenced to fifteen-years-to-
life. Even if she honestly believed that she needed to shoot him, her belief,
under the existing circumstances, was not a reasonable belief. In other
words, she is treated as if she killed in a situation that involved no claim of
justification.34
Under the governing Ohio law, a defendant can get a complete justifi-
cation defense only for a reasonable belief that her conduct is justified. If
her belief is honest but unreasonable in any way, she gets no defense or
mitigation at all.35 The Model Penal Code proposes a sliding-scale approach
that would provide at least a mitigation in liability where the defendant hon-
estly believes in the necessity for the defensive conduct but where that belief
34 State v. Shearer, 2018-Ohio-1688, No. CA 2017-07-102, 2018 WL 2041565 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 30, 2018); Associated Press, ‘I Think I Shot Him in The Head’ Ohio Woman Held in
Ex-Husband’s Slaying, CANTONREP (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.cantonrep.com/news/201702
07/i-think-i-shot-him-in-head-ohio-woman-held-in-ex-husbands-slaying [https://perma.cc/
4NWP-LLG2]; Larry Davis, Middletown Woman Charged with Murder Told 911 ‘I Just Shot
My Ex-husband’, LOCAL 12 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://local12.com/news/local/one-person-shot-in-
side-home-in-middletown [https://perma.cc/NNB4-CPQ2]; Lauren Peck, Middletown Woman
Convicted of Murder in Ex-Husband’s Death, J.-NEWS (June 23, 2017), https://www.journal-
news.com/news/middletown-woman-convicted-murder-husband-death/s3sB94eqY1cBGm0Sy
QBUDN/ [https://perma.cc/QN3U-J6QB]; Lauren Peck, Middletown Woman Indicted for
Murder in Shooting Death of Ex-Husband, J.-NEWS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.journal-news
.com/news/local/middletown-woman-indicted-for-murder-shooting-death-husband/ti2TWGkr
E4gvgPiSVrkF3M/ [https://perma.cc/C8YB-UH9F].
35 State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1345 (Ohio 1997) (“The trial court’s instructions
correctly emphasized to the jury that the second element of self-defense is a combined subjec-
tive and objective test. As this court established in State v. Sheets (1926), 115 Ohio St. 308,
310, 152 N.E. 664, self-defense ‘is placed on the grounds of the bona fides of defendant’s
belief, and reasonableness therefor, and whether, under the circumstances, he exercised a care-
ful and proper use of his own faculties.’”); see also State v. Ludt, 180 Ohio App. 2d 672, 2009-
Ohio-416, 906 N.E.2d 1182, at ¶22 (“Self-defense has both objective and subjective elements.
The defendant’s fear of immediate death or great bodily harm must be objectively reasonable.
In addition, ‘Ohio has adopted a subjective test in determining whether a particular defendant
properly acted in self-defense. The defendant’s state of mind is crucial to this defense.’ State v.
Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 215, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990).”).
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is unreasonable (reckless or negligent).36 Under this approach, an honest but
reckless mistake would provide a mitigation to manslaughter; an honest but
negligent mistake would provide a mitigation to negligent homicide. Unfor-
tunately, most states, even those otherwise adopting the Model Penal Code,
reject this sliding-scale approach in favor of the all-or-nothing approach,37
like Ohio’s, thereby denying even a mitigation in liability for an honest but
unreasonable mistake.38
These are just some examples of the specific doctrines that can conflict
with the blameworthiness proportionality principle by denying a deserved
mitigation. Other aspects of current law also produce such conflicts.39 Such
conflicts can also arise because of unique situations and circumstances rather
than flawed doctrines.40
2. Conflict Cases: Instances of Failure of Justice
While they are less common, the criminal justice system sometimes
adopts rules or procedures that routinely give a mitigation that is not de-
served. Such instances of Conflict-Failure of Justice (lower right-hand quad-
rant) include cases like that of Willie Bosket. By his own count, he has
committed thousands of crimes, including the rape of a fellow juvenile. At
age 15, he goes on an armed robbery spree. Two of his robbery attempts end
in the murder of the victims. While in custody awaiting his hearing, Bosket
stabs another boy with a fork, hits a counselor in the face, and chokes a
psychiatrist. Because he is a juvenile, he is ineligible for prosecution as an
36
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
37 See, e.g., MAPPING, supra note 26, at 152. Only five states adopt the sliding-scale ap-
proach. On the other hand, the majority of the states, twenty-nine in number, adopt an all-or-
nothing approach, under which the defense can be obtained only if the defendant’s belief in the
necessity of her conduct was reasonable. The remaining seventeen states drafted their defense
in purely objective terms, yet they provide a mistake as to justification defense but in a sepa-
rate mistake excuse provision.
38 The last case in the text above, Shearer, raises the doctrinal issue of mistake as to
justification. This is conceptually distinct from the previous cases, which all concern instances
of partial disability excuses as opposed to a partial mistake excuse. See Paul H. Robinson, A
System of Excuses: How Criminal Law’s Excuse Defenses Do, and Don’t, Work Together to
Exculpate Blameless (and Only Blameless) Offenders, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 259, 262–68
(2009). As with the disability mitigations, this mistake mitigation might best be fixed with a
change to the specific doctrine—here, defining mistake as to justification using the sliding-
scale approach. However, absent that, even though mistake mitigations are conceptually dis-
tinct from disability mitigations, one can define a general mitigation provision in broad enough
terms to cover both. See infra Part VII.A.
39 Consider, for example, the refusal of most jurisdictions to partially individualize the
objective standard used in the definition of recklessness and negligence. See, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c)&(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2019). This failure also infects every reliance
upon the term “reasonable” in the criminal code because “reasonable” is generally defined as
nonnegligent. See, e.g., id. § 1.13(16)).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 44–50.
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adult, no matter the seriousness of his crimes, and can only be detained in a
juvenile facility for 5.5 years,41 until he reaches the age of 21.42
Brian Varela, age twenty, is alone with an eighteen-year-old woman in
his bedroom who is using drugs that he has provided when the woman
passes out. When it becomes clear that she is suffering an overdose, Valera
begins posting photos of the women’s partially nude body to co-workers and
then sexually assaults her. When she is dead, he breaks her legs in order to
stuff her into a crate to hide the body. To keep suspicion away, he uses the
dead woman’s thumb to unlock her phone and sends text-messages to her
family. When caught, Varela enters a plea to second-degree manslaughter,
third-degree rape, and unlawful disposal of remains and is sentenced to
thirty-four months in prison,43 the highest sentence that he can be given
under the state’s sentencing guidelines because he is a first-time offender.44
Darla Jackson has a history of anger management issues, including hav-
ing her license suspended for having tried to run someone over. As she is
driving on a California freeway, a man on a Ducati motorcycle gets in front
of her. She aggressively engages the man, tailgating him and then danger-
ously passing him. When traffic slows, he comes up next to her and kicks
her car. As the Ducati exits the highway, she follows him, accelerates her car
to ninety-three miles per hour, and rams into him. Despite the fact that the
41 Katherine Ramsland, Willie Bosket, Crime Library, http://www.egov.ufsc.br/portal/
sites/default/files/anexos/10437-10437-1-PB.htm [https://perma.cc/S8J8-RCYR]; Fox Butter-
field, A Boy Who Killed Coldly Is Now a Prison ‘Monster’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1989), http://
www.nytimes.com/1989/03/22/nyregion/a-boy-who-killed-coldly-is-now-a-prison-monster
.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/S44Z-HP7E]; John P. Woods, New York’s
Juvenile Offender Law: An Overview and Analysis, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1980).
42 Under “the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, under which 14- and 15-year-olds who
commit serious crimes such as murder, kidnapping and rape . . . can be held in confinement
under what is called ‘restrictive placement’ in a state facility and be placed under supervision
until they are 21.” Tom Goldstein, New York’s Juvenile Justice System Is Under Challenge,
N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/1978/05/30/archives/new-yorks-juve-
nile-justice-system-is-under-challenge-news-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/CP48-RRYN].
43 Lea van der Merwe, Brian Varela Sentenced To Less Than 3 Years In Prison For Raping
Teen Dying, Of Overdose, Sharing Nude Pictures, INQUISITOR (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www
.inquisitr.com/5166450/brian-varela-sentenced-raping-teen-overdose-sharing-nudes/?utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+google%2FyDYq+%
28The+Inquisitr+-+News%29 [https://perma.cc/5R58-453N]; Jill Sederstrom, Man Gets
Less Than 3 Years For Raping Teen As She Lay Dying Of Drug Overdose ‘To Pass The Time’,
OXYGEN (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.oxygen.com/crime-time/brian-varela-sentenced-less-
than-3-years-raping-alyssa-noceda-as-she-died-drug-overdose [https://perma.cc/8SWB-
Q72X].
44 See WASHINGTON STATE CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2017 WASHINGTON STATE
ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 394, 435 (2017) (For second-degree manslaughter,
Varela’s score is 1, since he has no criminal record and he is convicted in the same case of one
nonviolent felony, the third-degree rape, which means his sentence must fall within the range
of 26–34 months. For third-degree rape, his score is also 1, again since he has no criminal
record and he is convicted of another felony, the second-degree manslaughter, and therefore
his sentence must fall within the range of 12–14 months).
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killing seems quite intentional, she is sentenced to six years and is eligible
for early release.45
Many Conflict-Failure of Justice cases are the result not of said policies
but rather of idiosyncratic judges exercising unchecked sentencing discre-
tion. Consider a few examples.
Ronald Ebens is a supervisor at a Chrysler plant. He feels that recent
lay-offs at Chrysler are the result of Japanese imports pushing the American
auto industry into decline. While at a strip club, he spots Vincent Chin, who
is having his bachelor party. Ebens believes Chin to be Japanese and he
yells, “It’s because of you motherfuckers that we’re out of work.” Some
punches are thrown, and the bouncers eject everyone involved. Outside the
club, Ebens gets a bat from his car and threatens Chin, who drives off with
his friends. Ebens gets in his car and begins to hunt for Chin, and he pays
others to help him with the hunt. When he finds the young man outside a
McDonald’s, he attacks him with the baseball bat, inflicting repeated strikes
to Chin’s head. Chin dies of his injuries. Ebens is allowed to plead to man-
slaughter and, citing his prior good character and lack of a criminal record,
the judge sentences him to three years of probation and a fine.46
Ethan Couch is the only child of wealthy parents who give him every
material advantage. While he is hosting a birthday party, he and seven other
people pile into his truck to get supplies. Couch, who has a blood alcohol
level of 0.24 with Valium and marijuana in his system, is driving danger-
ously when he loses control of his vehicle and crashes into another car, in-
stantly killing four people. Dazed but still cocky, Couch turns to his friend
and says, “I’m Ethan Couch, I’ll get you out of this.” Couch’s defense is that
his coddled upbringing impaired his ability to judge right from wrong. This
45 Monica Garske, Driver in Road Rage Crash That Killed Service Member Sentenced,
NBC SAN DIEGO (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Darla-Jackson-
Road-Rage-Sentencing-Zachary-Buob-Death-San-Diego-419478683.html [https://perma.cc/
7X6A-VYZ9]; Monica Garske, Road Rage Suspect Told Ex She’d Run Him Over, NBC SAN
DIEGO (June 2, 2015), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Road-Rage-Murder-Suspect-
Darla-Jackson-Ex-Boyfriends-Restraining-Orders-305908301.html [https://perma.cc/K6PZ-
NACR]; Dana Littlefield, Judge: Driver’s Behavior ‘Outrageously Reckless’ In Road-Rage
Crash That Killed Navy Man, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www
.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-jackson-sentence-20170413-story.html [https://
perma.cc/GF3J-XV9U]; Samantha Tatro, “As Long As It Gets Me Away From You”: Darla
Jackson’s Ex Happy She Filed Restraining Order, NBC SAN DIEGO (June 3, 2015), http://www
.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Darla-Jacksons-Ex-Happy-She-Filed-Restraining-Order-30607
7101.html [https://perma.cc/D7WF-7Y6N]; Explanation of California Parole Law, SHOUSE
CALIFORNIA LAW GROUP https://www.shouselaw.com/parolehub.html [https://perma.cc/
Z8HX-8NTN] (“Due to budget cuts and overcrowding, California is allowing ‘day for day’
credit, which cuts all sentences in half, but if considered a violent offense she may have to
serve 85%.”).
46 United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986); Ross Parker, “It’s Not Fair . . .,”
Vincent Chin’s Last Words, 14 HIST. SOC’Y FOR U.S. DIST. CT. FOR E. DIST. OF MICH., no. 4,
2007, at 8–9.
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“affluenza” defense gets him probation for ten years for the four counts of
manslaughter.47
David Kravchenko and two of his friends attack a twenty-three-year-old
man as he leaves a gay bar. Kravchenko repeatedly shouts, “You are going
to die faggot,” as he beats and stabs the stranger with a broken bottle.
Kravchenko is charged with aggravated assault. Although the victim’s
wounds are serious, Kravchenko is sentenced to only 364 days, on reasoning
by the judge that a sentence of a year or more would leave him, a native of
Russia, vulnerable to deportation.48
Stacey Rambold, a forty-nine-year-old high school teacher, repeatedly
coerces intercourse with a fourteen-year-old student. He is arrested, and the
victim, overwhelmed by depression, kills herself. Rambold is given only
thirty days in jail.49 The judge feels that the humiliation, loss of job, and
divorce that Rambold suffered as a result of his arrest is punishment enough
47 Sean Dooley & Lauren Effron, ‘Affluenza’ DUI Case: Never-Before-Seen Deposition
Tapes Reveal New Details of Fatal Crash, Teen’s Upbringing, ABC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/affluenza-dui-case-deposition-tapes-reveal-details-fatal/story?id=
34505481 [https://perma.cc/GHN2-FPSG]; Rebecca Mead, The Sad Lessons of the “Af-
fluenza” Teen, NEW YORKER (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-
comment/the-sad-lessons-of-the-affluenza-teen [https://perma.cc/N2G8-7B2U]; Michael J.
Mooney, The Worst Parents Ever, D MAGAZINE (May 2015), https://www.dmagazine.com/
publications/d-magazine/2015/may/affluenza-the-worst%20-parents-ever-ethan-couch/ [https:/
/perma.cc/7B2X-TLB9]; Will Payne & Daniel Bates, Sins of the ‘Affluenza’ Boy’s Parents:
Millionaire Father and Mother of Teen Let Off Despite Killing Four In DUI Crash Have Been
Accused of More Than TWENTY Crimes and Traffic Violations, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2524872/Millionaire-parents-affluenza-teen-20-ar-
rests-citations.html [https://perma.cc/9L7Q-EH5M]; Naheed Rajwani, ‘Affluenza Teen’ Ethan
Couch Released From Jail Days Before His 21st Birthday, Dallas News (Apr. 2, 2018), https://
www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2018/04/02/affluenza-teen-ethan-couch-released-jail-days-
before-21st-birthday [https://perma.cc/S92B-H93R]; Tribune Wire Reports, ‘Affluenza’ Teen
Ethan Couch Grew Up In Wealthy But Unstable Home, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 31, 2015), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-ethan-couch-20151231-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/A7NC-SRRN]; Tribune News Servs., Judge Orders ‘Affluenza’ Teen Ethan Couch to
Nearly 2 years in Jail, CHI. TRIBUNE (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/ct-affluenza-ethan-couch-jail-20160413-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z3HG-
PD2C]; Daniel Victor, Ethan Couch, ‘Affluenza Teen’ Who Killed 4 While Driving Drunk, Is
Freed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/us/ethan-couch-af-
fluenza-jail.html [https://perma.cc/VA9R-W75Y]; CNN Wire, Profile of Ethan Couch’s Par-
ents, Who Attorneys Argued Spoiled Him, Made Him Irresponsible, FOX 4 NEWS (Dec. 21,
2015), https://fox4kc.com/2015/12/21/profile-of-ethan-couchs-parents-who-attorneys-argued-
spoiled-him-made-him-irresponsible/ [https://perma.cc/Q4GR-QB9E];
48 David Keenan, The Difference a Day Makes: How Courts Circumvent Federal Immi-
gration Law at Sentencing, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139 (2007); Christopher Claridge, 2 Men
Sentenced to Year for Assault, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 23, 2005), https://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/2-men-sentenced-to-year-for-assault/ [https://perma.cc/ER6K-VATC]. He was
sentenced to six months in prison for the deadly weapon enhancement, but the judge said that
in his opinion it would not affect his immigration status.
49 The sentence is reviewed by the Supreme Court of Montana and found to be below the
statutory minimum. Rambold is re-sentenced and serves 2.5 years. Ashley Nerbovig, Teacher
Who Raped Student to be Paroled to California after less than 3 years in Prison, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Mar. 10, 2017), https://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/crime-and-
courts/teacher-who-raped-student-to-be-paroled-to-california-after/article_0e96cce1-e322-
517e-9fcc-24ad8e4f7598.html [https://perma.cc/MP5Q-TSJF].
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and that the victim is also to blame because there was not any “forcible
beating up thing.”50
In one final example, Brock Turner and a victim happen to attend the
same fraternity party where they both are drinking. Later that night, Turner is
caught sexually assaulting the unconscious victim. The victim is bleeding
and has penetrating trauma wounds in her vaginal area. At trial, Turner
blames the college party culture. He is convicted of three felony counts for
sexually assaulting the unconscious woman. Fearing that a more serious sen-
tence would have “a severe impact” and adverse collateral consequences on
Turner’s future, the judge sentences him to six months in county jail and
three years of probation, far less than the six years prosecutors had asked for
in line with the two-year minimum guideline for each of the three felony
counts.51
B. Damaging Responses Inspired by Points of Conflict:
Nullification and Shadow Vigilantism
One may object on several different grounds to the law’s treatment of
these cases in which the law and the community hold conflicting views on
mitigation. Retributivists may object on deontological grounds; crime-con-
trol utilitarians may object because they see such conflict cases as potentially
undermining the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community and
thereby reducing its crime-control effectiveness.52
A related concern is that such conflicts will inspire people to undermine
the system’s operations or distort its processes so as to generate results closer
to what the community sees as a just result. In the context of Conflict-Injus-
tice cases, this means nullification activities of one kind or another: prosecu-
tors choosing not to prosecute where the legal rules clearly provide for
liability, grand jurors refusing to indict without regard to clear evidence, trial
jurors acquitting despite the fact that the case has been clearly proven, sen-
50 John Bacon, Judge Apologizes for Teen Rape Remarks, Not Sentence, USA TODAY
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/28/teacher rape montana/
2722817/ [https://perma.cc/QF47-5848]; Laura Collins, Cherry Was Raped by Her Teacher at
14 and Shunned for Reporting It. Then She Shot Herself Dead in Her Mother’s Bed. Now Her
Mom Reveals Her Living Hell and Fury That Attacker Got Just 30 Days Jail, DAILY MAIL
(Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2405280/Cherice-Moralez-case-
Family-speak-living-hell-rape-Stacey-Rambold.html [https://perma.cc/QW9M-SVVJ]; Crime-
sider Staff, Montana Rape Case Update: State Prosecutors Appeal 30-Day Sentence in Case of
Teacher Who Raped Student, 14, CBS NEWS (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
montana-rape-case-update-state-prosecutors-appeal-30-day-sentence-in-case-of-teacher-who-
raped-student-14/ [https://perma.cc/2XCC-6Z3J].
51 Elle Hunt, ‘20 Minutes of Action’: Father Defends Stanford Student Son Convicted of
Sexual Assault, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/06/
father-stanford-university-student-brock-turner-sexual-assault-statement [https://perma.cc/
2UDF-TN48]; Marina Korin, Why the Stanford Judge Gave Brock Turner Six Months, ATLAN-
TIC (June 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/stanford-rape-case-
judge/487415/ [https://perma.cc/3CF3-AJ9T].
52 See supra text accompanying note 4.
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tencing judges giving reduced sentences that dramatically depart from the
sentencing guidelines in cases that are not exceptional, and governors or
presidents exercising their clemency or pardon power as a means of resen-
tencing offenders (as opposed to taking account of special postconviction
events). As discussed at the end of this Section, all of these nullification
activities are seriously problematic: a criminal justice system ought to aim to
satisfy blameworthiness proportionality through its normal operation rather
than inviting reliance upon such damaging nullification activities.
Such nullification activities are commonly inspired by Conflict-Injus-
tice cases in order to bring the punishment in line with deserved mitigation
(upper right-hand quadrant). For example, Angelo Parisi, a landscaper who
is upset to see his neighborhood falling into violence and despair brought on
by crack cocaine, tries to get the police to deal with the problem, but nothing
changes. When an abandoned building on the street becomes a crack house,
Parisi and a friend take up a collection from the neighborhood to buy gaso-
line to burn it down. After ensuring that the house is vacant, they set the fire.
No one is hurt by the blaze. Three weeks later, Parisi is charged with arson.
If convicted of the charges, the sentence could be up to 20 years. Despite his
having admitted to the arson and lacking any legal defense, the jury finds
Parisi not guilty.53
The well-known case of Bernhard Goetz provides another example.
With subway crime rates extremely high and having been previously injured
by muggers, Goetz begins to carry a gun when he rides the subway. When
four men confront him in a subway car demanding money, he shoots them,
including one of the men who no longer presents an immediate threat. No
one dies. The first grand jury refuses to indict him. After he is indicted by a
second grand jury, the trial jury acquits him of all shooting offenses, holding
him liable only on the gun charge.54
The refusal of the first Goetz grand jury to indict illustrates another
avenue of nullification. In the case of Joe Horn, for example, Horn sees two
men break into his neighbors’ home. He calls police and gets his shotgun. He
53 Dan Chu & Maria Leonhauser, Two Angry Neighbors Burn Out a Nest of Crack Deal-
ers, but Now They’re in Big Trouble Themselves, PEOPLE MAGAZINE (Mar. 28, 1998), http://
people.com/archive/two-angry-neighbors-burn-out-a-nest-of-crack-dealers-but-now-theyre-in-
big-trouble-themselves-vol-29-no-12/ [https://perma.cc/YAY4-WJN8]; Opinion, Crack: A
Disaster of Historic Dimension, Still Growing, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 1989), http://www.ny
times.com/1989/05/28/opinion/crack-a-disaster-of-historic-dimension-still-growing.html?page
wanted=all [https://perma.cc/GHK3-TQNE]; Isabel Wilkerson, ‘Crack House’ Fire: Justice
or Vigilantism?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/22/us/crack-
house-fire-justice-or-vigilantism.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/H9T4-NS8T].
54 On the gun charge, Goetz serves eight months in jail. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME
OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1990); Bernhard Goetz Trial:
1987, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/law/law-magazines/bernhard-goetz-
trial-1987 [https://perma.cc/Z7R7-QV97]; Bob Drogin, Prosecutor Calls Goetz ‘Vigilante,’
Urges His Conviction, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 1987) http://articles.latimes.com/1987-06-12/
news/mn-3977_1_subway-gunman [https://perma.cc/XGF8-4RT5]; Richard Stengel, A Troub-
led and Troubling Life, TIME (June 24, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,141513,00.html [https://perma.cc/2QRR-WSSB].
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stays on the line with the 9-1-1 operator and repeatedly expresses his frustra-
tion that crimes like this keep occurring, yet police do not seem willing or
able to stop them. With the police still not on the scene, the burglars are
getting ready to leave laden with their loot. Horn steps into the yard with his
gun raised and tells them to stop or he will shoot. When the men ignore his
warning and run off, Horn fires, and both men are killed. Murder charges are
filed. After hearing two weeks of testimony, the grand jury refuses to
indict.55
Even if there is no nullification action during the process, the occa-
sional lucky defendant can escape punishment through executive commuta-
tion. Cyntoia Brown, sixteen years old, is living with her abusive pimp when
she is sent to have sex with a 43-year-old man who has a room full of loaded
guns. When the man becomes violent, she shoots him in what she claims is
self-defense. Her self-defense claim is rejected at trial; Brown is convicted
of murder and receives a sentence of 51-years-to-life. But, her sentence is
later commuted by the Governor of Tennessee after public outcry that the
sentence is excessive given that Brown was a victim of human trafficking.56
In some cases, both the trial jury and the governor may be provoked to
nullify the normal application of the rules. Richard Jahnke is a sixteen-year-
old with a father who has physically abused him for most of his life. The
father becomes increasingly brutal and on the present occasion promises to
“get rid of” Richard when he (the father) returns home. The father has also
become sexually interested in his daughter. Fearing what is coming, Jahnke
lays in wait and, upon his father’s return, shoots his father as he stomps
toward him. Jahnke is tried for murder and conspiracy. While, according to
the Wyoming Supreme Court,57 he does not meet the requirements of self-
55 Adam Ellick, Grand Jury Clears Texan in the Killing of 2 Burglars, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/us/01texas.html [https://perma.cc/H35W-
AKBX]; Brian Rogers, Joe Horn Cleared by Grand Jury in Pasadena Shootings, STAR
CHRON. (June 30, 2008), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pasadena-news/article/Joe-
Horn-cleared-by-grand-jury-in-Pasadena-1587004.php [https://perma.cc/2WXA-D3PZ].
56 Carl M. Cannon, Cyntoia Brown and the Quality of Mercy, REAL CLEAR POL. (Jan. 13,
2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/01/13/cyntoia_brown_and_the_quality_
of_mercy_139161.html [https://perma.cc/8HMX-RH3Y]; Tamar Lapin, Celebs Rally for Sex
Trafficking Victim Who Got Life for Killing Her Abuser, N.Y. POST (Nov. 22, 2017), https://
nypost.com/2017/11/22/celebs-rally-for-sex-trafficking-victim-who-got-life-for-killing-her-
abuser/ [https://perma.cc/JZ7V-JW74]; Adam Tamburin, Cyntoia Brown’s Professor Speaks
As Clemency Decision Nears: ‘She’s Ready to Serve People’, USA TODAY (Dec. 23, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/23/cyntoia-brown-clemency-bill-has-
lam-tennessee-prison-reform/2402290002/ [https://perma.cc/EQB8-ML8W].
57 According to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Jahnke was not entitled to a provoked
heat of passion mitigation to manslaughter: “The jury convicted appellant of killing his father
voluntarily upon a sudden heat of passion. If lying in wait for one and one-half hours is a
‘sudden heat of passion,’ then appellant must have been frozen in time. This must have been
the longest ‘sudden’ in history. . . . In his defense appellant employed the oldest, most common
and most successful tactic in homicide cases. He put the deceased on trial. His strategy was
largely successful as he was convicted of a lesser offense when the uncontradicted evidence
and appellant’s admission pointed only to murder.” Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1010 (Wyo.
1984).
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defense or a mitigation of provoked heat of passion, the jury nonetheless
gives him the mitigation to voluntary manslaughter. He is sentenced to five-
to-fifteen years, but the sentence is commuted by the Governor of
Wyoming.58
Nullification is not limited to these major players in the criminal justice
system. It might be found anywhere that a participant sees what he or she
believes to be an injustice that needs to be avoided. With his brain-dead
infant son on life-support after an accident, Rodolfo Linares is haunted by
what he sees as the baby’s coming lifetime of suffering and loneliness in a
warehouse facility. He goes to the hospital, removes the child from the life-
support machines, and sits on the floor cuddling the baby while the baby
expires, holding the staff at bay with a gun. When the baby is dead, he gives
himself up to hospital security.59 The prosecutor seeks to charge Linares with
murder. Despite the district attorney’s efforts to prosecute, no murder
charges can be effectively brought because the coroner refuses to put homi-
cide as the cause of death. (Instead, he writes “lack of oxygen to the brain.”)
Eventually, Linares pleads guilty to unlawful use of a weapon and is directed
by the court to get a year of counseling.60
Gertrude Vaughan, a teenager, goes through her entire pregnancy refus-
ing to admit to herself or others that she is expecting. Panicked, alone, and
overwhelmed by shame, she gives birth alone at home. As the newborn lays
on the bathroom floor, emotionally disconnected Vaughan does nothing. She
does not clean up the mess or touch the baby, who soon dies.61 The teenager
is convicted of first-degree murder. On appeal, the verdict is overturned be-
cause the jury was not given an option of lesser crimes, such as negligent
homicide or manslaughter. Despite having already shown that they could
obtain a first-degree murder conviction, the prosecution chooses not to retry
Vaughan for any offense.62
In the context of the Conflict-Failure of Justice cases, the process is
subverted in the reverse way, through what has been called “shadow vigilan-
58 Id.; Mark Bagne, Richard Jahnke, a Teenager Who Killed the Father He . . ., UPI (June
14, 1984), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/06/14/Richard-Jahnke-a-teenager-who-killed-
the-father-he/5954456033600/ [https://perma.cc/DMT7-49YY]; Alan Prendergast, It’s You or
Me, Dad, ROLLING STONE, (May 26, 1983), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/features/its-
you-or-me-dad-19830526 [https://perma.cc/PML6-GFS8].
59 See, e.g., Associated Press, Father Is Cleared in Ill Baby’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 19,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/19/us/father-is-cleared-in-ill-baby-s-death.html
[https://perma.cc/CPJ8-8BFE]; Robert Blau & Jean Latz, Father: Killed Son Because I Love
Him, CHI. TRIBUNE (Apr. 27, 1989), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-04-27/news/
8904070827_1_respirator-samuel-comatose [https://perma.cc/Z7PW-YASJ].
60 Man Who Pulled Plug on Son Dies, UPI (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.upi.com/Man-
who-pulled-plug-on-son-dies/83711135187240/ [https://perma.cc/WE59-E7UQ]; Matt
O’Connor, Father Tells How He Let His Baby Son Die, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 24, 1989), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-05-24/news/8902030838_1_samuel-nurse-removed [https://
perma.cc/52K6-62Z7].
61 Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 801, 802 (Va. App. 1989).
62 See id. at 808.
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tism.”63 This occurs when people distort the normal operation of the criminal
justice system in order to fix the failure of deserved punishment that has
arisen from the undeserved mitigation and to bring the case more in line with
the punishment actually deserved (lower left-hand quadrant).
The classic vigilante takes the law into her own hands by unlawfully
imposing the punishment she believes the offender deserves but that the sys-
tem has failed to impose. In the case of William Malcolm, for example, a
sadistic serial pedophile is released and re-victimizes some of the same chil-
dren he had previously abused. When the courts decide that he cannot be put
on trial for these new attacks because the victims could not testify about the
current abuse without referring to prior abuses—precluding a fair trial in the
court’s view—he is sent back home yet again. The outraged neighborhood
decides that something must be done. Someone knocks on Malcolm’s door
and, when he answers it, shoots him in the face.64
Another example of classic vigilantism is found in the case of Ken Mc-
Elroy, a violent serial bully who for years has been terrorizing his neighbors
in rural Missouri. The police are afraid of him, and on the rare occasions that
he is brought up on charges, he has a stable of friends to provide false ali-
bies. After shooting an elderly shopkeeper, he is again arrested and set free.
Soon after being released on this last occasion, he is sitting in his truck in the
middle of town and is surrounded by a large group. He is shot and killed by
shots coming from six different people.65
The killers in both of these cases are classic vigilantes, but their suc-
cessful escape from prosecution depends on other “shadow vigilantes,” who
do not themselves participate in the killing but who consciously choose to
pervert the operation of the criminal justice system by refusing to identify
who they know to be the killer or killers. During the investigation of McEl-
63 Shadow vigilantism is “a reaction of lawlessness short of the physical confrontation of
classic vigilante action [that] occurs when ordinary people, instead of taking the law into their
own hands by going into the street, seek to manipulate the operation of the criminal justice
system in order to force from it the justice that it seems so reluctant to do on its own. . . .
Shadow vigilantes can be ordinary people who seek to influence the operation of the criminal
justice system whenever they have contact with it, as witnesses, as jurors, or even as voters
shaping the system. But shadow vigilantism is also common among the official participants in
the system who essentially conspire to undermine those rules and practices that they see as
regularly frustrating justice. Thus, shadow vigilantes can be police officers, prosecutors,
judges, and others.” PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, SHADOW VIGILANTES: HOW
DISTRUST IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM BREEDS A NEW KIND OF LAWLESSNESS 49 (2018).
64 See, e.g., id. at 147–50; NIGEL CAWTHORNE, UNDERWORLD UK: VIGILANTES: FIGHTING
CRIME WITH CRIME (2010); Gary Jones & James Fletcher, We’ll Shed No Tears; Murdered Sex
Fiend Who Lived in Shadow of Hatred, DAILY MIRROR (Feb. 19, 2000), http://www.thefree-
library.com/WE’LL+SHED+NO+TEARS%3B+Murdered+sex+fiend+who+lived+in+
shadow+of+hatred.-a060292519 [https://perma.cc/V73R-UX8N]; Witness Plea after
Paedophile Killing, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/648475
.stm [https://perma.cc/R7XW-GJR8].
65
HARRY N. MACLEAN, IN BROAD DAYLIGHT (1988); ROBINSON & ROBINSON, supra note
63, at 51–54; A. G. Sulzberger, Town Mute for 30 Years about a Bully’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/us/16bully.html [https://perma.cc/
76U4-5NXS].
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roy’s death, for example, the authorities find that dozens of people witnessed
the shooting of McElroy, yet, in this town of 400 people, not a single person
provides the authorities with information as to who any of the shooters
might be.
Shadow vigilantes are not limited to disaffected citizens. They can in-
clude active participants in the criminal justice process. Consider, for exam-
ple, the investigation of William Sheard. Soon after a brutal child rape and
murder, police determine that the attacker lives in a particular building.
When they knock on Sheard’s door, they become suspicious because of the
fresh scratches on his face that he cannot explain. They enter his apartment
and find blood-stained clothing and other inculpatory evidence, evidence
that would certainly have been destroyed if they had waited to get a search
warrant. The police claim that Sheard invited them in and that the evidence
was in plain view, but Sheard vehemently denies this, and there is good
reason to believe the police are fudging—“testilying”—because they be-
lieve it is justified as the only means of bringing this child rapist murderer to
justice.66
And, the shadow vigilante impulse of criminal justice system partici-
pants is not limited to police officers. It can be felt by anyone in the system
who has a sense of justice. For example, it is not uncommon for trial juries to
“cover” for classic vigilantes by providing an acquittal through jury nullifi-
cation. Recall the vigilante cases discussed above where the offender was
acquitted despite clear legal rules and evidence supporting liability: Parisi
burning down a crack house, Goetz shooting robbers on the subway even
when no longer under threat, and Horn shooting burglars fleeing his neigh-
bor’s house.67
The shadow vigilante impulse is also felt by judges. Consider, for ex-
ample, the case of Ray Brent Marsh, who owns a crematorium in a rural area
in which the furnace has broken and will be expensive to fix. To keep his
business going, he takes in bodies for cremation but simply throws them in
his large backyard. His conduct goes undiscovered for years and ends up
involving nearly 300 bodies.68
The entire community is outraged by his offensive treatment of so
many loved ones, so he must wear a bulletproof vest when transported to
court for proceedings. The outraged families are even more offended when
66 See United States v. Sheard, 473 F.2d 139, 141–42 (D.C. Cir. 1972); ROBINSON &
ROBINSON, supra note 63, at 186–88.
67 See supra text accompanying notes 53–55.
68 See, e.g., David Firestone & Michael Moss, More Corpses Are Discovered Near Cre-
matory, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/18/us/more-corpses-
are-discovered-near-crematory.html [https://perma.cc/P83X-FBMB]; Sara Rimer, Crematory
Owners’ Family Asks Why, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/24/
us/crematory-owners-family-asks-why.html [https://perma.cc/J2UJ-9QD7]; Sara Rimer,
Dazed by Crematory Scandal, Undertakers’ Trust Is Shaken, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/21/us/dazed-by-crematory-scandal-undertakers-trust-is-
shaken.html [https://perma.cc/8438-M52U].
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\HLL103.txt unknown Seq: 24  6-JAN-20 15:17
242 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 57
they learn that, under existing Georgia law, Marsh cannot be convicted of
any of his instances of abuse of corpses because the state statutory language
does not strictly cover his conduct. He can only be convicted of a minor
fraud offense for misrepresenting his services, an offense that would not
normally bring prison time. Even his multiple violations would normally
support only a minor sentence. It seems clear, however, that the judge takes
the opportunity to give him some of the deserved punishment he has escaped
when he sentences Marsh to twelve years in prison.
Similarly, Melvin Ignatow escapes conviction for a horrific rape, tor-
ture, and murder of a former girlfriend until the photographs he took of his
deeds are discovered. Although he had previously obtained a false acquittal
by perjuring himself at trial, double jeopardy bars his retrial.69 But the judge
sentencing him for his perjury takes the opportunity to punish him for the
offenses for which he cannot be convicted, giving him seventeen years for
his perjury.70
This same kind of shadow vigilantism by judges is evident in Conflict-
Failure of Justice cases (lower right-hand quadrant), where an offender gets
an undeserved mitigation, and the sentencing judge takes the opportunity at
a later time to give a sentence well beyond what would normally be imposed
in an effort to correct for the earlier failure of justice.
Robert Downey Jr. has a serious addiction problem. He is picked up by
police many times for drug-related criminal behavior but is typically let go
because he is a blockbuster film star who has brought pleasure and entertain-
ment to thousands of people. On the rare occasions that he is charged and
convicted, the judge always sends him to rehab, even though he never com-
69 See PAUL ROBINSON & MICHAEL CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE 117–36 (2005);
ROBINSON & ROBINSON, supra note 63, at 82; Susan Craighead, Attorney’s Slip of the Tongue
Led to Break in Schaefer Case, COURIER-J., Mar. 1, 1990, at A1; Todd Murphy, Ignatow
Witness Pleads Guilty to Evidence Tampering, COURIER-J., Dec. 3, 1991, at B1; Mary
O’Doherty, Threatening-Letter Trial Begins for Missing Woman’s Boss, COURIER-J., Aug. 9,
1989, at B1; Clay Ryce, Schaefer’s Boss is Charged in Threat Against Her Fiance, COURIER-J.,
Mar. 26, 1989, at B1; Leslie Scanlon, ‘I Did Not Kill Her’; Ignatow’s Ex-Lover Admits Helping
Dig Hole for Victim, COURIER-J., Dec. 18, 1991, at A1; Leslie Scanlon, Ignatow Confesses to
Killing Schaefer, COURIER-J., Oct. 3, 1992, at A1; Leslie Scanlon, Ignatow’s Lawyer Blames
Shore-Inlow, COURIER-J., Dec. 10, 1991, at A1; Leslie Scanlon, No Evidence Links Ignatow
with Murder, Jurors Say, COURIER-J., Dec. 23, 1991, at A1; Cary B. Willis, FBI Recorded
Murder Suspect in Brenda Schaefer Case, COURIER-J., Feb. 6, 1990, at A1; Cary B. Willis,
Ignatow Lawyer Says Release of Tape Should Rule Out Death, COURIER-J., Feb. 7, 1990, at
A1; Andrew Wolfson, Finding Evidence in Home a Fluke, COURIER-J., Oct. 3, 1992, at A1;
Deborah Yetter, Federal Grand Jury Indicts Ignatow on Perjury Charge, COURIER-J., Jan. 9,
1992, at A1; Associated Press, After Nearly Two Years in Prison, Ignatow, Cleared in Slaying,
Free, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 1991, at 9A; Associated Press, Man, Acquitted Once, Gets 8
Years in Death of Tortured Girlfriend, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 14, 1992), http://commu-
nity.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19921114&slug=1524598 [https://perma.cc/
3Q4U-Z55A]; see generally BOB HILL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: OBSESSION, MURDER, AND JUSTICE
DENIED (1995); Elinor J. Brecher, Brenda Schaefer: ‘That Woman Who Disappeared’—How
Could This Ordinary Person with No Apparent Enemies—a Doctor’s Office Assistant Who
Lived with Her Parents—Just Simply Vanish?, COURIER-J., Mar. 5, 1989, at A4.
70 Eight years from the federal system, followed by nine years from the state of Kentucky.
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pletes the court-mandated program. Finally, however, a sentencing judge de-
cides that Downey’s repeated disregard of his obligations is cause for serious
action and imposes a three-year prison sentence for probation violation.71
The sentence is all the more unusual because California’s Proposition 36
requires that treatment, not prison, be given to most non-violent offenders,72
the probation report specifically recommends that Downey not go to
prison,73 and there is evidence to support the defense’s claim that Downey is
now actually “on the road to rehabilitation.”74
Neville Wells, a forty-one-year-old party promoter is an alcoholic with
a history of driving while drunk. Despite his two previous DUI convictions,
he is still allowed to drive. With a blood alcohol level of .22, he runs his
mini-van through red lights, hits a parked car, then continues to speed down
the road and strikes a moving car. The force of the collision is so great that
the other driver’s heart explodes in her chest. Wells attempts to flee the
scene. Driving deaths such as this are usually tried as vehicular homicide in
New York and draw sentences of three years or less. But, in this instance,
Wells is charged with second-degree murder.75 The judge is not willing to
listen to Wells’s defense that he is an alcoholic. In the view of the judge, the
“defendant’s intoxication at the time of the collision, no matter how
debilitating, is immaterial, as is his history of chronic alcoholism.”76 In a
rare verdict, something that has happened only a handful of times in New
York State, Wells is convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced
to seventeen-years-to-life in prison.77
The first kind of nullification cases discussed above—maneuvering to
avoid injustice resulting from the denial of mitigation the offender de-
serves—is problematic for the criminal justice system, and the system ought
to do whatever is necessary to avoid provoking such conduct. Such activi-
71 See, e.g., Edward Boyer, Robert Downey Jr. Released From Prison by Appeals Court
Ruling, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/aug/03/local/me-63699
[https://perma.cc/EMX9-MFHB]; Gatecrasher, ‘Iron Man’ Actor Robert Downey Jr. Tells
Rolling Stone About Prison, Heroin, Cocaine and the Future, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 28,
2010), https://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/iron-man-actor-robert-downey-jr-
tells-rolling-stone-prison-heroin-cocaine-future-article-1.163247 [https://perma.cc/3DRU-
68S5]; David K. Li, He’s Got Appeal: Downey Jr. Out of Jail, N.Y. POST (Aug. 3, 2000),
https://nypost.com/2000/08/03/hes-got-appeal-downey-jr-out-of-jail/ [https://perma.cc/CA8E-
VVYK]; Monte Morin, Robert Downey Jr. Gets 3 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/aug/06/local/me-63303 [https://perma.cc/54PA-9DQ9].
72 Duncan Campbell, Downey Admits to Cocaine Charge, but Avoids Prison, GUARDIAN
(July 16, 2001), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jul/17/filmnews.film [https://perma
.cc/M2LN-ZH5S]
73 See Morin, supra note 71.
74 Li, supra note 71.
75 People v. Wells, 862 N.Y.S.2d 20, 29 (App. Div. 2008); Hoda Kotb, The Worst Kind of
Drunk Driver, NBC NIGHTLINE (July 19, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13320570/ns/
dateline_nbc/t/worst-kind-drunk-drivers/#.XD9OilxKg60 [http://perma.cc/77MA-G6NN].
76 Wells, 862 N.Y.S.2d. at 28.
77 On appeal, the court concludes that there is no reason that the trial judge cannot apply
the standard “of depraved indifference to human life” to this case despite the fact that it has
not been done before. See id.
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ties, in which actors ignore the criminal justice system’s rules and substitute
their own, undermine the legislative prerogative and, in that sense, are un-
democratic. Perhaps more importantly, such activities foster arbitrariness
and unpredictability. The participants in one case may work up the courage
to nullify, while those in an identical case may not. The result is a system
that is neither transparent nor consistent. Further, where the law on the
books is replaced with ad hoc nullification judgments, the system fails to
provide fair notice of the governing criminal law rules. Finally, even where
nullification activities avoid an injustice, they also take away the public dis-
closure of the criminal law’s problem, as well as the resulting outrage that
might serve to reform the system to avoid such injustices in the future.78
The second kind of nullification activity—shadow vigilantism—works
in reverse: it perverts the normal operation of the system in order to impose
deserved punishment that the system failed to provide. But, it creates the
same kind of systemic problems as nullification of liability activities.
Shadow-vigilante conduct undemocratically undermines the legislative pre-
rogative. It fosters unpredictability and arbitrariness: participants may be
provoked to act in one case, while participants in an identical case are not.
As with nullification of liability, the resulting system is neither transparent
nor consistent. While shadow-vigilante activities avoid objectionable fail-
ures of justice, they hide the system’s failures and short-circuit resulting out-
rage that might prompt reforms that would help avoid such failures of justice
in the future.79
By undermining the criminal justice system’s reputation for trans-
parency and consistency, both nullification of liability and shadow-vigilante
activity can provoke their own backlash by those offended by their inconsis-
tency, leading to a downward spiral of declining reputation and declining
deference, which then further undermines the system’s reputation.80 The
criminal law would do better to provide the mitigation deserved under the
principle of blameworthiness proportionality, and thereby avoid the injus-
tices that can provoke liability nullification as well as the failures of justice
that can provoke shadow vigilantism.
C. Empirical Support for Deserved Mitigation Claims
The characterization of the cases discussed above as being “conflict”
cases of one sort or another is not based simply upon the personal judgment
of the author, but supported by a simple empirical study in which a group of
ordinary people were asked for their justice judgments about whether or not
78 See, e.g., Roger Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1274
(2011); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 488, 512 (1976).
79
ROBINSON & ROBINSON, supra note 63, at 195–97.
80 Id. at 201–14.
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mitigation was appropriate in each of the cases.81 The results are reported
below.82
Tables 1 and 2 below show the subjects’ judgments about the extent of
mitigation deserved, if any, in each case. The subjects were given four alter-
native answer options:
0: No mitigation of blame; 0% reduction in punishment.
1: Minor mitigation of blame; less than 10% reduction in punishment.
2: Medium mitigation of blame; 10-50% reduction in punishment.
3: Major mitigation of blame; greater than 50% reduction in
punishment.
Because each higher offense grade commonly doubles the maximum
punishment, the last option (mitigation of greater than 50%) essentially sug-
gests at least a reduction of an offense grade. The mode for each case is
reported in the two tables below. (Where the number of responses for the
second most popular choice is close to the number for the most popular, both
options are shown.) Both Table 1 and Table 2 show cases where the offender
has failed to receive a deserved mitigation.83
81 There is no suggestion here that the cases discussed above are a random selection of
cases. Rather, these cases were selected because they nicely illustrate the point that there do
exist law-community disagreements on a wide variety of instances of mitigation. The study
does not aim to explain or to map people’s mitigation judgments but only to test the reliability
of the author’s characterization of each of these cases.
82 Using the paid online survey service SurveyMonkey, 131 subjects read the instructions
and scenarios reproduced in the Appendix and answered one question about the appropriate
mitigation in each case. The modes of the responses obtained are reported in Tables 1–4 and in
notes 123 and 130, infra. The mode (the most common response) rather than the mean is
reported because a review of the data suggested that a number of respondents did not appear to
be taking the survey in good faith and provided irrational, internally inconsistent, or apparently
random answers to the survey, such as providing the same response for every question. It
seems unlikely, for example, that a good-faith respondent would really believe that Rambold,
who repeatedly coerced intercourse with his fourteen-year-old student and received only thirty
days in jail, was “punished a lot more than deserved.” (The bad-faith responses probably
occurred in part because the survey, with twenty-eight scenarios, was overly ambitious. During
in-person pretesting, it commonly took a good-faith respondent twenty-five minutes or more.
The completion rate for the survey was only fifty-eight percent.) One could try to identify and
exclude the apparently bad-faith respondents from the data, but it was thought prudent to avoid
making such judgment calls and to simply report the modes instead. The means did track the
expected results but were diluted by bad-faith responses; however, one can only speculate as to
the location and extent of such dilution.
The 131 respondents had the following demographics:
Age: 39%, 18–29; 34%, 30–44; 24%, 45–60; 4% over 60.
Gender: 77% female; 23% male.
Income: largest income groups were 21%, $25,000–49,999; 21%, $50,000–74,999; and
18%, $75,000–99,999.
83 For authorities in support of the facts and dispositions of the cases contained in the
following four tables, see the footnotes accompanying the text where the cases are discussed:
Table 1, supra text accompanying notes 23–34; Table 2, supra text accompanying notes 53–62;
Table 3, supra text accompanying notes 41–51; Table 4, supra text accompanying notes 71–77.
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TABLE 1. FAILS TO RECEIVE DESERVED MITIGATION
(UPPER LEFT-HAND QUADRANT)
Case Summary Mode Actual liability result
Gounagias Sodomized by roommate. After 2 Murder, fifteen-years-
weeks of taunting by his social to-life
group, the humiliated Gounagias
kills his attacker while the man
sleeps.
Randolph Randolph’s daughter is responding 2 Bank robbery, must
well to chemotherapy when his serve maximum
insurance runs out. He robs a bank twenty-five years
to pay for her continued treatment.
Dixon Facing threats of violence to her 2, 3 Illegal gun purchase,
children at the hands of her abusive nine concurrent three-
boyfriend, Dixon illegally buys him year terms
weapons.
Gurney Having suffered a severe head 1, 2 Murder and arson, sixty
trauma in an accident and after years (ten of which are
twenty-two surgeries, Gurney still for the arson)
has psychotic episodes and
personality issues. After failing to
take his medication, he kills his
girlfriend in a brutal and bizarre
ritual.
Gridine Just after finding a small shotgun, 2 Attempted armed
fourteen-year-old Gridine asks a robbery, attempted
passing man for his wallet. As the murder, seventy years
man walks away, he shoots and
lightly wounds him.
Shearer After her abusive ex-husband 2, 3 Murder, fifteen-years-
chokes her unconscious, Shearer to-life
awakens to find his gun next to
her. Believing the gun is there so
he can kill her, she picks it up and
shoots him dead.
TABLE 2. FAILS TO RECEIVE DESERVED MITIGATION—
BUT PROVIDED THROUGH NULLIFICATION ACTION
(UPPER RIGHT-HAND QUADRANT)
Case Summary Mode Actual liability result
Parisi Out of concern for the damage that 2 Freely admits to the act
drugs are doing to his but is acquitted at trial
neighborhood, Parisi burns out a (jury nullification)
crack house which he knows to be
vacant.
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Case Summary Mode Actual liability result
Goetz Goetz shoots and wounds four 2, 3 Acquitted of assault,
would-be muggers on the New eight months on gun
York subway. charge (jury
nullification)
Horn After a rash of burglaries, Horn 2 Grand jury refuses to
shoots two burglars who refuse his indict (grand jury
warnings to stop as they flee a nullification)
neighbor’s house with loot.
Brown Pimped out by her violent 3 Murder, sentenced to
boyfriend, sixteen-year-old Brown fifty-one years,
shoots a forty-three-year-old client commuted by
who turns violent while his loaded Tennessee Governor
guns are nearby.
Jahnke Sixteen-year-old Jahnke kills his 3 Convicted of
abusive father who has promised to manslaughter, serves
assault Jahnke upon the father’s three years before
return. commuted by North
Dakota Governor
Linares Wrought with worry about his 2, 3 Coroner will not put
child’s ongoing suffering and homicide as cause of
isolation, young father Linares death; sentenced to one
holds hospital staff at bay as he year of counseling
removes his brain-dead baby from (coroner nullification)
life-support.
Vaughan Emotionally disconnected sixteen- 2 Guilty of murder, new
year-old Vaughn delivers trial ordered, no retrial
unacknowledged baby on the (prosecutorial
bathroom floor. The baby dies from nullification)
neglect.
As is apparent from the modes in the third column of the tables, the
subjects most commonly see these cases as deserving of mitigation. Yet, as
the last column of Table 1 suggests, the legal rules commonly failed to pro-
vide the deserved mitigation, although it may sometimes be provided
through some kind of nullification action, as noted in the last column of
Table 2.
Tables 3 and 4 below show the subjects’ judgments about whether the
sentence imposed accurately reflects the extent of mitigation, if any, that the
offender deserved. For each case, subjects were told of the circumstances of
the offense and the sentence imposed and were given seven alternative op-
tions in answering this question:
Was the mitigation provided by the court too much, just right, or not
enough?
-3: Mitigation provided was far too much (punished a lot less than
deserved).
-2: Mitigation provided was too much.
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-1: Mitigation provided was a little too much.
0: Mitigation provided was just right.
1: Should have received a little more mitigation.
2: Should have received more mitigation.
3: Should have received much more mitigation (punished a lot more
than deserved).
TABLE 3. RECEIVES UNDESERVED MITIGATION
(LOWER RIGHT-HAND QUADRANT)
Case Summary Mode Actual liability result
Jackson Enraged because Jackson feels -3 Plea bargain of
motorcyclist cut her off in traffic, voluntary manslaughter,
she follows him off the highway six-year sentence
and rams him at ninety miles per
hour.
Varela As a woman overdoses on his -3 Convicted of second
drugs, Varela rapes her and posts degree manslaughter,
photos of the rape. When she dies, third degree rape and
he attempts to cover up the crime. unlawful disposal of
human remains;
receives thirty-six-
month sentence, the
maximum allowed for
first-time offender
Bosket By his own count, Bosket has -3 Due to youth, he can
committed thousands of crimes by only be sentenced to
the age of fourteen, including rape. 5.5 years in juvenile
At age fifteen, during an armed detention for the
robbery spree, he kills two men in murders and the armed
different events in the same week. robberies
Ebens Ebens, an auto plant supervisor -3 Guilty of manslaughter,
who resents Japanese imports hunts three years of probation
down and beats a man to death for because judge feels that
looking Japanese. Ebens is normally an
upstanding citizen
Couch Sixteen-year-old Couch is driving -3 Guilty of four counts of
drunk and high on drugs when he intoxication
crashes into a disabled car, killing manslaughter and two
four and wounding others. counts of intoxication
assault causing serious
bodily injury, ten years
of probation, based on
an affluenza defense
Kravchenko While shouting anti-gay remarks, -3 Misdemeanor assault,
Kravchenko stabs with a broken 364 days, so he will
bottle a stranger leaving a gay bar. not be deported
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Case Summary Mode Actual liability result
Rambold Rambold, a high-school teacher -3 Told to attend sexual
repeatedly coerces intercourse with offender classes, fails
his fourteen-year-old student. the class, and then
given thirty days. Judge
says he has suffered
enough, and the victim
was not physically
beaten
Turner While both Turner and his victim -3 Convicted of three
are drunk, he attempts to rape the sexual assault charges,
unconscious woman. When two three months because
passersby intervene, he tries to more would ruin his
escape. future
TABLE 4. RECEIVES UNDESERVED MITIGATION—
BUT UNDERMINED BY SHADOW VIGILANTE ACTION
(LOWER LEFT-HAND QUADRANT)
Case Summary Mode Actual liability result
Downey Downey, a long-time drug addict 0 Probation violation,
and a celebrity actor, is repeatedly three years, court says
arrested and sent to rehab. He is he is manipulative, and
charged with a parole violation for that state is out of
continued drug use but argues he is patience. No addiction
an addict. defense allowed
Wells Wells, a long-term alcoholic and 0 Convicted of second
repeat offender, gets in his car after degree murder,
fifteen drinks and kills a motorist. seventeen years. Denied
alcoholic mitigation
Again, the modes in the third column show the conflict with the legal
rules in Table 3. But, as Table 4 suggests, shadow vigilantes may attempt to
compensate for the undeserved mitigation given by the legal rules, and the
study respondents approve of the results of this kind of compensating
conduct.
These results are consistent with other related empirical studies.84
84 See, e.g., IJUD, supra note 4, at 239–400; Paul H. Robinson, Sean E. Jackowitz, &
Daniel M. Bartels, Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good
Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Pun-
ishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737 (2012).
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D. Summation of Law-Community Conflict
It has been argued above that the system would be better off if the legal
rules were constructed to recognize mitigations deserved under the principle
of blameworthiness proportionality.85 What legal reforms would that mean,
and could such reforms be feasibly undertaken?
Even the brief review of illustrative cases above suggests a wide range
of reforms to current doctrines that would better approximate deserved miti-
gations, including, for example, broadening of the traditional provoked heat
of passion mitigation to murder, shifting from an all-or-nothing approach to
a sliding-scale approach for mistake as to justification, recognizing a mitiga-
tion in cases of “near excuse,” and a variety of other doctrinal reforms dis-
cussed above.86
Unfortunately, the political realities of American crime politics suggest
that this kind of criminal code rewrite—providing reforms for a long list of
specific doctrines—may not be feasible.87 More importantly, even if this col-
lection of reforms could be enacted, it would only fix the discrete subset of
problematic cases affected by specific doctrines. It would not provide a gen-
eral assurance that the system would recognize a deserved mitigation that
might arise in any of a wide variety of cases, sometimes in unique or unex-
pected circumstances.
The law ought to, at the very least, provide a statutory general mitiga-
tion provision. Not only would it be more comprehensive in its coverage, but
it also might be politically less threatening: as a general mitigation provi-
sion, it would be clear on its face that it did not provide an escape from
criminal liability, but rather would affect only the degree of punishment to
be imposed. Could such a general mitigation provision be constructed and, if
so, could it be politically feasible?
V. THE CASE FOR A GENERAL MITIGATION
The notion of a statutory mitigation provision is not foreign to current
law. As noted above, a mitigation from murder to manslaughter has long
been commonly authorized for a provoked killing done in the heat of pas-
sion.88 One might ask whether the logic and rationale of that doctrine neces-
sarily calls for some broader statutory provision. It is argued here that in a
modern world increasingly concerned with adhering to proportionality be-
tween personal blameworthiness and punishment,89 the restrictions inherent
in the provocation mitigation are anachronistic. Mitigation of liability ought
85 See supra text accompanying notes 6–12.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 23–38.
87 See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005).
88 See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also MAPPING, supra note 26, at 46–51.
89 See, e.g., the Model Code amendment discussed in supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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to be available in a wide variety of cases beyond the rules of traditional
provocation and even beyond the offense of murder or the emotion of “heat
of passion.” If this is so, in what instances should a mitigation be available?
A. Should a Murder Mitigation Be Limited to Cases
of Provoked “Heat of Passion”?
In the classic provocation case, the defendant flies into a rage because
he or she feels wronged in some way and kills the person who has provoked
the rage. A rape victim kills his or her attacker as the attacker is leaving the
scene. The defendant kills his spouse, or her lover, or both, upon finding
them in bed together. Upon hearing that his child was victimized, the defen-
dant rushes off to kill the victimizer. In each case, one can argue that while
the killing is blameworthy and deserves punishment, it is importantly less
blameworthy than the same killing done in the absence of the rage induced
by the provoking circumstances.
Yet, it seems clear that mitigating circumstances can go well beyond
instances of current law’s provoked “heat of passion.” Many offenders who
deserve mitigation will be denied because their offense is driven by some-
thing other than the provoked “heat of passion.” Recall some of the cases of
deserved mitigation discussed above: Linares, overwrought by his child’s
ongoing suffering and isolation, holds the hospital staff at bay while he
removes his brain-dead baby from life-support.90 Disconnected sixteen-year-
old Vaughan delivers a baby on the bathroom floor and then simply ignores
him.91 Facing threats of violence to her children at the hands of her abusive
boyfriend, Dixon illegally buys him weapons.92 After finding a small shot-
gun, fourteen-year-old Gridine shoots and lightly wounds a man walking by
(getting 70 years for attempted murder).93
None of these cases involve provoked heat-of-passion, but all are in-
stances where the defendant, while acting improperly, does deserve some
reduction in liability from that which would be appropriate in a case without
the mitigating circumstances. Yet, under current legal schemes, none of
these offenders are entitled to a mitigation in liability.94 (Part VII.B. will
discuss whether it is adequate to leave such cases to the ad hoc discretionary
judgment of individual sentencing judges.)
Even for the classic provoked “heat of passion” cases, traditional rules
are too limiting in defining when mitigation is deserved. Recall the
Gounagias case, in which Gounagias, after being mercilessly taunted by
others for having been forcibly sodomized earlier, boils over and shoots his
90 See supra note 59.
91 See Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 801, 802 (Va. App. 1989).
92 See supra note 28.
93 See State v. Gurney, 36 A.3d 893 (Me. 2012).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 21–38.
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original rapist.95 Despite the fact that his killing is clearly in heat of passion
provoked by the conduct of others, no provocation mitigation is available to
him. The forcible rape and taunting are ignored—not even admissible at
trial—and Gounagias’ killing is to be treated as indistinguishable from the
standard unprovoked murder. As noted previously,96 under the traditional
provocation rule, the circumstances that triggered the killing are held to be
legally irrelevant because they fail to meet several of the traditional rule’s
requirements. A period of time passed between the rape and the killing that
disqualifies Gounagias; the legal mitigation requires an immediate killing in
response to the provocation without any “cooling time.” Further, the imme-
diate provoking incident—the public taunting at the local bar (which is not
barred by the “cooling time” rule)—disqualifies Gounagias because he does
not kill the provokers (those taunting him). Gounagias is given a sentence of
life imprisonment at hard labor and dies in prison.
Even the 1962 Model Penal Code drafters, citing the Gounagias case as
an example,97 saw the injustice of the provocation-mitigation limitations and
recommended a broader formulation. Their mitigation from murder to man-
slaughter was available without regard to “cooling time,” nor limited to kill-
ings of the immediate provoker, nor even limited to cases of “heat of
passion.” Instead, the mitigation was broadened to be available whenever an
offender killed “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”98 Under this
broader formulation, the “reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under
the circumstances as he believes them to be.”99 Unfortunately, only ten of
the fifty-two American criminal codes have adopted this broader formula-
tion.100 The overwhelming majority continue to follow some form of the
traditional provocation rule.101
Even the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance mitigation
is too narrow in some respects in that the blameworthiness proportionality
principle demands a more universal mitigation provision: the mitigation
should be available in cases beyond murder and in cases beyond those of
emotional disturbance.
95 See State v. Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 305–07, 316–19 (1915).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 23–24.
97
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at 59 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
98 Id. § 210.3(1)(b). (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
99 Id.
100 See MAPPING, supra note 26, at ch. 5 (2018).
101 For a discussion of the variations among those states, see id.
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B. Should a Disturbance-Based Mitigation Be Limited
to Cases of Murder?
Clearly, the effect of the provocation mitigation (and the broader “ex-
treme emotional disturbance” mitigation) is substantial. Under the Model
Penal Code, for example, downgrading murder to manslaughter may be the
difference between life (or death) and imprisonment for a maximum of 10
years.102 But if emotional disturbance can so dramatically mitigate criminal
liability in homicide cases, why shouldn’t the Model Penal Code recognize a
parallel mitigation for other serious offenses. For example, in any case in
which the offender would be eligible for a provocation mitigation if the vic-
tim dies but where, luckily, the victim does not die, why shouldn’t a mitiga-
tion still be available? Aggravated assault is a serious offense with a serious
penalty. Under the Model Penal Code, for example, it is a second-degree
felony,103 carrying the same penalty as manslaughter. If the same mitigating
circumstances exist, why shouldn’t they call for a comparable mitigation in
punishment to the next lower offense grade in cases where the victim does
not happen to die?
Before the advent of modern criminal codes, one might have argued
that there were practical challenges to broadening a mitigation beyond the
most serious offense of murder. Criminal code offense grading categories
reflected only broad punishment differences, too large to capture the some-
times lesser adjustment called for by some mitigations. But nearly all mod-
ern codes today use a scheme of offense grading significantly more nuanced
than the three degrees of felony and one degree of misdemeanor plus petty
misdemeanor found in the Model Penal Code. Most modern codes have
more than a dozen offense grading categories.104 (The offense grading cate-
gories are usually defined exponentially, so an increase in one grade may
double the maximum punishment, while a decrease in one grade may halve
the maximum punishment.105) Further, even without relying upon an offense
grading scheme, one could create a universal mitigation by providing, for
example, a certain percentage reduction.
Thus, to satisfy the blameworthiness proportionality principle, one
might adopt a general mitigation provision that applies to all felonies, a task
102 Under the Model Penal Code, for example, murder is a first-degree felony punishable
with a maximum sentence of not more than 20 years or life, while manslaughter is a second-
degree felony with a maximum sentence of not more than 10 years. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 6.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
103 Id. § 211.1(2)(a). (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
104 See REPORT ON OFFENSE GRADING IN NEW JERSEY, UNIV. OF PA. CRIM. L. RES. GROUP
9 (Jan. 2011), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/183-nj-grading-report [https://perma.cc/
X9BS-L6AE]. See also Paul H. Robinson, The Rise and Fall and Resurrection of American
Criminal Codes, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 173 (2015).
105 See, e.g., 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 106; Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 12.21–12.35.
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made feasible by use of modern criminal code drafting techniques. (The text
of such a provision is proposed in Part VII.A below.)
C. Should a General Mitigation Be Limited to Cases of Mental
or Emotional Disturbance?
There is good reason to argue that even an emotional-disturbance miti-
gation broadened to include all felonies may be too narrow. Why should the
mitigation be limited to offenses committed during extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance? Consider the range of cases in which special mitigating
circumstances may operate primarily to motivate the actor to commit the
offense, rather than to create a mental or emotional disturbance: Parisi burns
down his neighborhood’s crack house out of frustration that the police are
doing nothing to address the problem.106 Randolph robs a bank to pay for his
daughter’s chemotherapy.107 After a rash of burglaries, Horn shoots two bur-
glars who refuse his warnings to stop as they flee with their loot from his
neighbor’s house.108 Each of these offenders has acted improperly and de-
serves punishment, but it would be seriously unjust to treat them as if the
empathetic circumstances that drove their offenses never existed. In other
words, there is good reason to think that the blameworthiness proportionality
principle requires a general mitigation provision of some considerable
breadth.
On the other hand, the same principle requires that the mitigation provi-
sion also exclude cases that are not deserving of mitigation. Recall the wide
range of cases in the two lower quadrants of the graphic, listed in Tables 3
and 4, for which the community is likely to see a mitigation as inappropriate.
The challenge, then, is to sort out what operating principles ought to govern
such a general mitigation provision.
VI. OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR A GENERAL MITIGATION PROVISION
The bedrock principle upon which a general mitigation provision
should be based is relatively straightforward: An offender is entitled to a
mitigation in liability and punishment if the offense circumstances and the
offender’s situation or capacities meaningfully reduce the offender’s blame-
worthiness for the violation. This is simply an expression of the demands of
the blameworthiness proportionality principle. Even ordinary people will in-
tuitively understand the meaning of this principle and will be able to opera-
tionalize it in individual cases.
It would be useful, however, if a general mitigation statute could go
further to suggest to jurors, for example, the kinds of issues that they ought
106 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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to think about in making their deserved-mitigation judgments. It is suggested
here that there are at least three distinct inquiries that ought to be included in
assessing whether an offender is entitled to a mitigation. As shorthand, they
might be referred to as (1) the psychic state inquiry: to what extent was the
offender acting under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance or
upset at the time of the offense?; (2) the personal choice inquiry: given the
offender’s circumstances and capacities, to what extent could we have ex-
pected the offender to have avoided committing the offense?; and (3) the
normative inquiry: to what extent would giving the offender a mitigation
specially undermine community norms?
A. The Psychic State Inquiry
The common wisdom reflected in the popular press, as well as in some
of the legal case law, suggests that a disturbance-based mitigation, such as
provoked heat of passion, is given because at the time of the offense the
defendant is “out-of-control.” As one writer explains, “Under the traditional
view, emotions ‘happen’ to a person. They occur without being willed and
tend to overwhelm all that we would will; they destroy rationality and
responsibility.”109
In reality, however, persons acting even in a state of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance do continue to have control over their conduct. Even
the person provoked by an outrageous situation who kills in a “heat of pas-
sion” retains the ability to simply swallow his anger and avoid the killing.
“The traditional view . . . represents a fundamental misconception about
emotion. Although there are significant obstacles to emotive self-control,
self-control is possible.”110
However, conceding that an actor is still responsible for an offense
committed in a state of mental or emotional disturbance does not necessarily
undermine the arguments for providing a mitigation in liability. Yes, the of-
fender has a moral obligation to control his actions and yes, the offender
remains morally responsible for what he does, but that only explains why it
is that his or her disturbed state ought not give rise to a complete defense. It
is still accurate to say that an actor under mental or emotional disturbance
may find it more difficult to remain law-abiding than a person who commits
the identical offense without suffering any sort of mental or emotional dis-
turbance. Thus, the provocation mitigation, for example, serves to distin-
guish a special subset of intentional killings from the typical murder by the
degree of blameworthiness of the offender.
The question then becomes not whether the mental or emotional distur-
bance caused the offender to be “out of control” at the time of the offense,
109 Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punish-
ment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 654, 677 (1989).
110 Id.
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but rather whether the disturbance at the time of the offense makes the of-
fender noticeably less blameworthy than an offender committing the same
offense without the disturbance. Gounagias flies into a rage after being pub-
licly taunted about his earlier rape victimization.111 His humiliation and re-
sulting anger make him desperate to kill his assailant. It is within his ability
to exercise restraint, and we would certainly prefer that he does, but when he
fails to do so his emotional state and the circumstances that caused it mean-
ingfully distinguish him from the person who kills with no such provoked
disturbance.
What is it, then, that determines whether a particular mental or emo-
tional state at the time of a particular offense caused by a particular distur-
bance-inducing situation will sufficiently distinguish an offender from other
offenders committing the same offense without the disturbed state, so as to
merit giving this offender a mitigation?
It turns out that this is a significantly more nuanced issue than the ap-
parently simple question of whether the offender acted in the “heat of pas-
sion.” Indeed, it is more nuanced even than the Model Penal Code
formulation under which an offender can get a mitigation to manslaughter if
he killed “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”112
It is easy enough to see that there is a continuum of the extent to which
an offender may be disturbed or upset at the time of the offense. He may be
in an extreme rage that may seem to an outsider as if he is “out-of-control.”
Or, the offender may be seriously disturbed, albeit something short of a wild
rage. Or, the offender may seem thoughtful and rational, yet the circum-
stances are motivating him to commit an offense that he otherwise would not
commit.
Consider some examples of these contrasting levels of mental or emo-
tional disturbance—enraged, disturbed, or merely motivated. Recall the case
of Darla Jackson. She is driving on a California freeway when she becomes
enraged by a motorcyclist’s driving. She accelerates her car into him at
ninety-five miles per hour, throwing him to his death.113 Jackson seems to
have snapped into an out-of-control rage. Compare that to the case of 16-
year-old Vaughan, who delivers her baby in her bathroom but, overwhelmed
by the unexpected experience, allows the baby to die.114 Vaughan is hardly in
a rage at the time of her offense but clearly seems to be emotionally dis-
turbed. Then compare these cases to that of Rodolfo Linares,115 who holds
hospital workers at bay with a gun after he disconnects life-support ma-
chines and cradles his baby while the baby expires, then surrenders to hospi-
111 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
112
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
113 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
114 See Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 801, 802 (Va. App. 1989).
115 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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tal security. There is no indication at the time of the offense that Linares is
acting in a particularly disturbed state. He has a plan and calmly carries it
out. His empathetic emotions motivate the offense but do not render him
out-of-control or even emotionally disturbed the time of the offense. He may
be upset, but he is hardly mentally or emotionally disturbed.
If one followed the common law provocation heat of passion rule, only
a “rage” case would be eligible for mitigation; disturbance and motivation
cases would not.116 On the other hand, the Model Penal Code drafters have
made a good case for providing a mitigation to some “disturbance” cases.
But, as suggested previously, one can argue that a wide variety of motiva-
tion-only cases, such as Parisi,117 Randolph,118 and Horn,119 deserve mitiga-
tion. Thus, one might conclude that there is no fixed minimum level of
disturbance required to deserve a mitigation. However, it may also be the
case that the greater the extent of the rage or disturbance, the greater the
chance that a mitigation will be deserved—depending upon the additional
factors discussed below: the personal choice inquiry and the normative
inquiry.
B. The Personal Choice Inquiry
Even an act done in extreme rage—an act seeming to be “out-of-con-
trol”—may not have an effect toward reducing an actor’s blameworthiness
for the offense. That blameworthiness judgment requires an assessment of
whether, given the offender’s circumstances and capacities, his or her reac-
tion to the situation makes sense or was at least understandable. Some reac-
tions will not be understandable, but rather the offender’s reaction will be
seen as extreme or inexplicable—she just “let herself go” in a way that
showed inexcusable indifference to the wrong she was committing. That is,
we may conclude that the offender should have made some greater effort to
restrain herself from committing the offense, and her shortcoming in failing
to exercise restraint was such that she deserves no mitigation for her offense.
We cannot condition mitigation on a requirement that the offender must
have acted as a “reasonable person” would have acted in the situation, for if
that were the case, the offender would seem to be entitled to a complete
excuse. Instead, the inquiry here is more modest. Even if the psychic state is
genuine and dramatic—the offender really feels driven to commit the of-
fense (the feeling is not fake or pretend)—if the offender’s reaction is silly or
absurd, if ordinary people simply would not act that way even in the actor’s
difficult situation, then the offender may be ineligible for a mitigation. In
116 Even though it may involve rage, the Jackson case referred to in the text would not be
eligible for the common-law mitigation because the provoking event by the motorcyclist is not
on the list of factors that by law can trigger the mitigation.
117 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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such cases, we would be inclined to say instead that the person “grossly
overreacted” or “should have gotten his or her emotions under control” or
some other assessment that treats the offense as a product of a selfish choice
rather than an understandable (if disappointing) reaction to a difficult
situation.
Instances of reactions that seem inexplicably excessive in degree appear
in the context of all types of emotions. Consider Mary Konye’s jealousy of
her friend’s beauty. Her friend frequently insults Konye’s looks and preens at
her own. After one insult too many, Konye reacts by throwing acid in her
friend’s face.120 Also consider Amy Bishop, a Harvard-trained researcher
with a high opinion of her genius who is denied tenure. She shoots six of her
colleagues, three of whom die.121 In a final example, Jane Andrews feels
humiliated when her dreams of an upper-class life are dashed because her
socially-prominent boyfriend decides to call off their wedding. She
bludgeons him to death.122 It seems doubtful that any of these actors deserve
a mitigation for their emotion-driven crimes.123
A fair assessment of the understandability of the reaction may require
an examination of more than the immediate situation. For example, it might
include an assessment of the offender’s history. A wife who has been regu-
larly beaten by her drunken husband may be given greater latitude in keep-
120 Press Association, Mary Konye Jailed for 12 Years for Acid Attack on Former Friend in
East London, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/
21/mary-konye-jailed-12-years-acid-attack-oni-friend-london [https://perma.cc/34UJ-NGQN];
Hayley Dixon, Jealous Student ‘Ambushed Friend with Acid in Copycat Attack’, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10555055/Jealous-student-
ambushed-friend-with-acid-in-Katie-Piper-copycat-attack.html [https://perma.cc/876X-
RRQ4]; Lizzie Parry, Jealous Friend Spent Years Obsessing over Naomi Oni’s Looks and
Tried to Steal Her Boyfriend Before Hurling Acid in Her Face, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2546518/Jealous-friend-spent-years-obsessing-
Naomi-Onis-looks-tried-steal-boyfriend-hurling-acid-face.html [https://perma.cc/22P3-
CUJU].
121 Shaila Dewan, Stephanie Saul, & Katie Zezima, For Professor, Fury Just Beneath the
Surface, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/us/21bishop.html
[https://perma.cc/D2LV-8S7U]; Patrick Radden Keefe, A Loaded Gun: A Mass Shooter’s
Tragic Past, NEW YORKER (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/11/
a-loaded-gun [https://perma.cc/37C8-Q772]; Amy Wallace, What Made This University Re-
searcher Snap?, WIRED (Feb. 28, 2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/02/ff_bishop/ [https://
perma.cc/HB6J-AB5P]; Robin Wilson, Amy Bishop Is Sentenced to Life in Prison, Bringing
Legal Case to an End, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 24, 2012), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/Amy-Bishop-Is-Sentenced-to/134624 [https://perma.cc/VU2L-UTDM].
122 Richard Alleyne, The Killer Who Could Not Take Rejection, TELEGRAPH (May 17,
2001), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1330515/The-killer-who-could-not-take-re-
jection.html [https://perma.cc/HR2G-VVGN]; Peter Stubley, Jane Andrews: Naked Ambition,
COURT NEWS UK, http://courtnewsuk.co.uk/jane-andrews/ [https://perma.cc/5B6C-CZLJ];
Was it Really Murder? Part I, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/
theguardian/2003/aug/30/weekend7.weekend1 [https://perma.cc/NX5Y-HBAD]; Michael
Seamark & Richard Kay, Former Royal Aide is Found Guilty of Love Rage Murder, DAILY
MAIL, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-46817/Former-royal-aide-guilty-love-rage-
murder.html [https://perma.cc/2BM5-G98B].
123 These cases were included in the empirical study reported in Part IV.C and all had
modes of zero (no mitigation).
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ing control of her emotions that drive her to kill him. In contrast, a history of
rage attacks may give another offender less latitude, and instead a much
greater obligation to control his anger, on the theory that his prior conduct
has put him on notice that some retraining and reform is required.
It may also be important to take account of the nature of the stimulus.
For example, as a social scientist might explain, there is a difference be-
tween what might be called fast and slow emotions.124 A fast emotion, such
as fear, operates almost instantly and may involve almost exclusively the
autonomic nervous system. A slow emotion, such as love, can involve a
good deal of physiological processing.125 The resulting effect of the emotion
may be the same, in terms of rage versus disturbance versus motivation, but
whether the emotion in the case is one that acts fast or slowly may make a
difference to the personal choice inquiry. People may have less expectation
that an actor successfully resist acting on a fast emotion, such as fear, yet
have greater expectation that the same actor should be more able to resist
acting on a slow emotion, such as love.
In other words, there is not only a continuum of the degree of emotional
state to be taken into account (as part of the psychic state inquiry)—rage
versus disturbance versus motivation—but also a continuum of the under-
standability of the offender’s reaction to the situation (as part of the personal
choice inquiry).
The Model Penal Code requires that for a judge to mitigate murder to
manslaughter, the killing be must done under the influence of “extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse.” That is, the Code requires a reasonable explanation for having the
mental or emotional disturbance. But that is not the relevant issue. The im-
portant question is, given the extent of the disturbance and given the of-
fender’s circumstances and capacities, how understandable is the offender’s
failure to resist committing the offense?
The Model Penal Code’s formulation conflates the psychic state inquiry
and the personal choice inquiry in ways that are at once both too broad and
too narrow. By limiting the mitigation to “extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance,” it would seem to provide too narrow a mitigation by excluding all
cases where the offense is driven by disturbance that is not “extreme,” as
well as by excluding motivation-only cases.
At the same time, the Model Penal Code’s formulation is too broad in
that it would allow mitigation whenever there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse for the extreme mental or emotional disturbance. We may well un-
derstand why the offender is extremely disturbed yet nonetheless feel that
the offense contemplated was so serious that, under the circumstances, the
124 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux
eds., 1st ed. 2011).
125 Cf. Robert W. Levenson, Autonomic Nervous System Differences Among Emotions, 3
PSYCHOL. SCI. 23–27 (1992) (describing physiological responses to anger, fear, sadness, and
disgust).
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offender should have made a more serious effort to resist it. Many cases
undeserving of a mitigation, such as those of Konye, Bishop, and Andrews,
noted immediately above,126 are cases in which we can understand why the
offender is extremely disturbed (as the Model Penal Code requires) but none-
theless feel that, even given that extreme disturbance, the offender should
have done more to resist committing the offense and thus the offender is not
entitled to a mitigation. It is entirely understandable that Mary Konye is
outraged by her friend’s regular insults, but throwing acid in her friend’s face
is something that she nonetheless should have restrained herself from doing.
It may be entirely believable that Amy Bishop is outraged at having been
denied tenure, but we think she nonetheless should have resisted shooting
her six colleagues. It makes perfect sense that Jane Andrews feels humiliated
when her socially-prominent boyfriend cancels their wedding, but we think
that she nonetheless should have resisted bludgeoning him to death.
It seems likely that our judgments about what should be expected of a
disturbed or upset offender will vary according to the seriousness of the
offense. The more serious the offense, the more we would expect even an
enraged offender to get himself under control to avoid the offense. For ex-
ample, we may have some hesitation about giving Kerrie Lenkerd a mitiga-
tion when out of disgust she shoots at a young man trying to have sex with
the neighbor’s dog, but we might be somewhat less hesitant if instead of
shooting at him she throws a glass of water or a tennis racket.127
The larger point is that the Model Penal Code’s formulation simply does
not recognize that the two separate inquiries—the psychic state inquiry and
the personal choice inquiry—must be separately assessed. This failure re-
sults in a formulation so open-ended that it may help account for why the
Model Penal Code’s formulation was rejected by the vast majority of juris-
dictions. Its unpopularity also may stem from its failure to appreciate the
need to investigate a third factor, the normative inquiry.
C. The Normative Inquiry
Even if the offender is seriously enraged and even if that reaction is
understandable given the offender, his circumstances, and his capacities, the
propriety of a mitigation ought to also take into account community norms.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 120–122.
127 Steven Nelson, Woman Charged for Pointing Gun at Teen Allegedly Raping Dog, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 8, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-
05-08/woman-who-pointed-gun-at-teen-accused-of-raping-dog-charged-with-aggravated-as-
sault [https://perma.cc/CC4L-NAKV]; Jimmy Nsubuga, Woman Arrested After ‘Shooting at
Boy, 14, Raping a Dog’, METRO (May 6, 2017, 2:59 PM), https://metro.co.uk/2017/05/06/
woman-arrested-after-shooting-at-boy-14-raping-a-dog-6619621/ [https://perma.cc/L277-
URS3]; 5 News Web Staff, Charges Dropped Against Woman Who Shot at Teen Trying to
Allegedly Rape Neighbor’s Dog, 5 NEWS (May 17, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://5newsonline.com/
2017/05/16/charges-dropped-against-woman-who-shot-at-teen-trying-to-allegedly-rape-neigh-
bors-dog/ [https://perma.cc/75S6-FDU8].
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If giving a mitigation to the offender would be taken as legitimizing or ap-
proving a norm that the community finds abhorrent, then it may be appropri-
ate to deny the mitigation. No matter how sympathetic one might be in
judging the offender strictly by the terms of his own worldview, that sympa-
thy can be lost when the community finds his worldview offensive.128
A strong and predictable rage based upon racial hatred or homophobia,
for example, could not earn a mitigation without seeming to give some legit-
imacy to those hateful attitudes. Jeremy Christian boards a commuter train
and begins to harangue a pair of teenage girls wearing hijab. He spews hate-
ful remarks at the girls, and when some passengers come to the girls’ aid,
Christian kills the men.129 Even if we thought Christian was in a genuine
rage, and even if some special circumstances in his life could make his rage
seem understandable to us, we would want to reject any mitigation for him if
it might be taken to legitimize his offensive views.130
As a final point, it should be noted that there is a danger that this third
inquiry—the extent to which giving a mitigation to the offender would un-
dermine community norms—could be interpreted too broadly. That is, every
mitigation and defense may undercut the community norm that condemns
the conduct constituting the offense at hand. Linares has admittedly commit-
ted aggravated assault by pointing his gun at the hospital staff. Giving him a
mitigation could, it might be argued, undermine the community norm
against aggravated assault. But the focus of this third inquiry ought to be
much more specific: would the reason for giving the mitigation undermine
community norms? In the Linares context, the father’s empathy for his brain-
dead infant leads him to hold the hospital staff at bay with the gun.131 The
reason for giving the mitigation—Linares’ empathy—would not undermine
community norms.
128 And, in any case, such a mitigation would be regularly blocked by a decision-maker
reflecting community norms, through any of the paths of nullification and shadow vigilantism
discussed in Part IV.B.
129 State’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Set Bail, State v. Chris-
tian, No. C 17CR34550 (Or. Cir. Ct. Multnomah Cty. Nov. 13, 2017); Maxine Bernstein,
Portland MAX Hero’s Last Words: ‘Tell Everyone on This Train I Love Them’, OREGONIAN
(May 29, 2017), http://www.Oregonlive.com/Portland/2017/05/Max_Heros_Last_words_tell_
ever.html [https://perma.cc/KX7M-HU6M]; Carli Brosseau & Allan Brettman, Jeremy Chris-
tian’s Path From Troubled Youth to TriMet Stabbing Suspect, OREGONIAN (Jan. 9, 2019), http://
www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/June 11, 2017/06/jeremy_Christians_path_from_tr
.html [https://perma.cc/3CB9-NELK]; Associated Press, Suspect in Portland Stabbings Built
Life Around Hate Speech, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017, 5:27 AM), https://www
.dailynews.com/2017/06/04/suspect-in-portland-stabbings-built-life-around-hate-speech/
[https://perma.cc/X669-JHPT]; Jason Wilson, Suspect in Portland Double Murder Posted
White Supremacist Material Online, GUARDIAN (May 28, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/27/portland-double-murder-white-supremacist-muslim-
hate-speech [https://perma.cc/4RLD-FJ7M].
130 In fact, ordinary people believe that Christian does not deserve mitigation. In the em-
pirical study described in Part IV.C., for example, the statistical mode for Christian was zero
(no mitigation).
131 See supra text accompanying note 59.
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One can imagine a spectrum of emotions from positive to negative.
Some positive emotions seem so appealing that one might be tempted to
give them some special accommodation—perhaps allowing a particularly
positive emotion to provide a mitigation when a more neutral emotion in the
same situation would not. When Jose Ferreira is seventeen, he accidentally
kills a sixteen-year-old girl. Some thirty years later, overwhelmed by a sense
of remorse, he turns himself in to incredulous police.132 Giving a mitigation
for genuine and heartfelt remorse would not undermine community norms,
and indeed might strengthen them. Similarly, in the Linares context, the of-
fender puts himself in legal jeopardy simply out of empathy for his brain-
dead baby.133 Providing a mitigation to Linares would seem to support the
valuable societal norm in support of empathy.
It may be that the normative assessment of the offender’s actions cre-
ates a sliding-scale in which offenders driven by a positive emotion, such as
empathy or remorse,134 may be given some greater leeway in getting a miti-
gation, while offenders driven by a negative emotion, such as hate or jeal-
ousy, may be given less leeway.135
These three distinct inquiries ought to be included in assessing whether
an offender is entitled to a mitigation: the psychic state inquiry (to what
extent was the offender acting under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance or upset at the time of the offense?), the personal choice inquiry
(given the offender’s circumstances and capacities, to what extent could we
have expected the offender to have avoided committing the offense?), and
the normative inquiry (to what extent would giving the offender a mitigation
specially undermine community norms?).
132 David Lohr, Man ‘Haunted’ By Schoolgirl’s 1982 Death Accepts Plea Deal, HUFFPOST
(Jan. 19, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jose-ferreira-carrie-ann-jopek
_us_58810ad7e4b096b4a2306517 [https://perma.cc/8K9N-PPY3]; David Lohr,‘Your Daugh-
ter’s Haunting Me’, HUFFPOST (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jose-fer-
reira-carrie-ann-jopek_us_56254f64e4b0bce34701b57e?ncid=fcbklnkushpmg00000021
[https://perma.cc/V4BT-KR32]; Ivan Moreno, Milwaukee Man Gets 7 Years in Prison After
Confessing in Teen Girl’s 1982 Death, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 18, 2017, 8:48 PM), http://www
.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-milwaukee-cold-case-confession-sentence-201703
18-story.html [https://perma.cc/HW72-UZWT].
133 See supra text accompanying note 59.
134 The remorse emotion operates somewhat differently than other emotions, of course. It
typically drives an offender not to commit the offense but more frequently to turn himself in to
authorities or engage in some other self-sacrificing conduct after commission of the offense.
135 One might argue, for example, that some positive emotions might provide a mitigation
in motivation-only cases while allowing other more neutral motivations only for offenses per-
formed under rage or disturbance. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the valence of the
emotion—whether it is negative, positive, or neutral—may affect our judgment about whether
the emotion is an understandable reaction to the situation, whether the offender has done
enough to control his or her emotion—the personal choice inquiry discussed above. That is, for
negative emotions, we may create an absolute demand that people hold this emotion in check
no matter what.
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VII. IMPLEMENTATION
To summarize, an offender ought to be entitled to a mitigation when-
ever the offense circumstances and the offender’s situation and capacities
meaningfully reduce the offender’s blameworthiness for the offense. The
process of making that judgment is one that ought to include at the very least
an assessment of three factors: (1) the extent of the disturbance or upset, if
any, pushing toward the offense (the psychic state inquiry); (2) the extent to
which we can understand why, given her circumstances and capacities, she
did not avoid committing the offense (the personal choice inquiry); and (3)
the extent to which granting a mitigation would specially undermine com-
munity norms (the normative inquiry). How might a general mitigation
based on these factors be implemented?
A. A Proposed General Mitigation Provision
A draft provision might look something like the following:
General Mitigation
(1) An offender is entitled to a mitigation in liability and punishment if
the offense circumstances and the offender’s situation and capacities mean-
ingfully reduce the offender’s blameworthiness for the violation.
(2) In determining whether an offender is eligible for a mitigation and
the extent of any such mitigation, the jury shall take into account:
(a) the extent to which the offender was acting under the influence
of mental or emotional disturbance or was upset at the time of the
offense;
(b) given the offender’s situation and capacities, the extent to
which one can understand why the offender failed to avoid committing
the offense; and
(c) the extent to which giving the offender a mitigation would spe-
cially undermine community norms.
(3) Where the jury determines that:
(a) a substantial mitigation is appropriate, it may reduce the grade
of the offense by one grade; or
(b) a lesser mitigation is appropriate, it may leave the extent of the
mitigation to the judgment of the court.
(4) Nothing in this provision shall preclude the court from mitigating
an offender’s punishment in any way authorized by law.
As section (4) confirms, the proposal presented here is not one that
takes away a sentencing judge’s ability to provide a mitigation, but rather
one that creates an additional ability for the jury to insist that a mitigation be
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provided.136 If, after some experience with the codified mitigation, one came
to have confidence that juries could reliably and consistently perform the
mitigation assessment function, one could dispense with section (4).
Notice that section (1) states the legally binding mitigation rule. Section
(2) instructs the jury about the kind of things they should be sure to think
about in assessing the blameworthiness proportionality called for in section
(1). To give an example illustrating the importance of the difference between
these two sections, consider cases of remorse, such as Ferreira, who reports
himself to police thirty-five years after accidentally killing a female neigh-
bor when he was a teenager. Section (2)’s factors all concern mitigating cir-
cumstances at work at the time of the offense. Remorse, of course, operates
only after the offense is complete. However, there is nothing in the provision
that would prevent a jury from providing a mitigation for Ferreira if it con-
cludes that the case satisfies the requirements of section (1).
B. Should a General Mitigation Provision be Applied by a Sentencing
Judge, or Should It Provide a Common Analytic Structure
for All Decision-Makers, Including Juries?
With the exception of the provocation mitigation from murder to man-
slaughter, any mitigation today is typically decided by judges in the exercise
of sentencing discretion. But that standard practice ought to be seen as prob-
lematic for a number of reasons.
First, a codified mitigation provision can provide greater uniformity in
application than simply deferring to the discretion of individual sentencing
judges. The understandability of an offender’s failure to avoid committing
the offense involves issues on which most people have some kind of intui-
tive justice judgment, but without the framework of some kind of analytic
structure, different people’s intuitions on a case may play out differently if
for no other reason than that different people may focus on different factors.
Only a codified mitigation provision can set each decision-maker with the
same task and orientation.
Second, our demands for greater nuance in matching the proportionality
of the punishment to the blameworthiness of the offender has increased dra-
matically over the last half-century. The three degrees of felonies137 and one
degree of misdemeanor plus petty misdemeanor138 reflected in the 1962
Model Penal Code grading scheme have been replaced with two or three
136 For those concerned that such a system might give rise to too many jury compromise
verdicts, understand that this kind of compromise might be more attractive than the current
system, which can force two unattractive choices on a jury that can make jury determination
very unpredictable and unsatisfying. It is in both sides’ interests to have a system that allows
the jury to best approximate the proper proportionality of criminal liability and punishment to
the defendant’s blameworthiness.
137
MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
138 Id. § 6.08.
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times as many offense grades. And sentencing guidelines have gone even
further, as with the fifty-two levels of the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion Guidelines. Thus, the gross approximations that unguided discretionary
judgments could have satisfied in an earlier era are inadequate today.
Third, a general mitigation is the classic kind of normative judgment
decision that requires a jury rather than an individual sentencing judge. As I
have detailed elsewhere, if the primary goal of the criminal justice system is
to do justice (rather than primarily to preventively detain potential offend-
ers), then a jury is better suited than a judge to perform this normative task.
This is due to the jury better representing community judgments, and be-
cause groups tend to do better at decisions involving judgments or valuations
and are better at taking multiple factors into account.139 Further, jury deci-
sion-making on these issues will improve the system’s reputation with the
community for being just, and, as noted previously, such increased moral
credibility can have significant crime-control benefits.140
Fourth, there are good constitutional reasons to argue that any factor
that can have a significant effect on punishment ought to be determined by a
jury rather than by the discretionary judgment of a single sentencing judge.
Indeed, the strong trend is toward having more jury participation in deter-
mining the facts that affect punishment, not less. In Apprendi v. New Jersey,
the Supreme Court held that “every defendant has the right to insist that the
prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment,”141
and the Court has carried forward this view in other cases.142
Finally, part of the value of having a codified provision is that it re-
quires a principled analysis of what the contours of the mitigation doctrine
should be. A collection of case opinions can provide a partial set of rules,
but unlike an appellate judge dealing with the case at hand, a code provision
provides a universal rule that will apply to all cases, and that kind of drafting
simply cannot be done without first elucidating the underlying governing
principles. Development of such a principle is a significant and challenging
analytic task, well beyond what is realistic to expect of an individual sen-
tencing judge or even a panel of appellate judges deciding an individual
case.
C. Is Such a Codified Mitigation Workable in Practice
and Feasible Politically?
An objection one might make to the proposed general mitigation is that
it seems to use quite open-ended criteria. The decision-maker is asked to
139 Paul H. Robinson & Barbra A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Deci-
sionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1146 (2005).
140 See IJUD, supra note 4, at 141–88.
141 530 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2000); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313
(2004) (articulating holding of Apprendi).
142 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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judge whether the circumstances of the offense and offender suggest reduced
blameworthiness. In making that decision, the decision-maker is asked to
consider: (1) the extent of the offender’s disturbance or upset at the time of
committing the offense, if any; (2) how understandable the offender’s failure
to avoid committing the offense is, given his situation and capacities; and (3)
whether giving the offender a mitigation would specially undermine commu-
nity norms enough to render the offender ineligible for the mitigation.
Clearly, this decisional process relies heavily upon the decision-maker’s
judgments of justice that may, in many respects, be largely intuitional rather
than analytic.
However, the complexity of the justice judgment being requested here
ought not be a matter of concern. As I have demonstrated elsewhere,143 ordi-
nary people across demographics have very nuanced and sophisticated judg-
ments of justice. Even small changes in facts can produce predictable
changes in assessments of deserved liability and punishment. In other words,
jurors do have the sophistication to make these judgments.
One might object to the formulation on the ground that the legality
principle generally prefers more specific and objective liability and punish-
ment criteria. However, as I have discussed elsewhere,144 there are two kinds
of legality, and the drafting demands for the ex ante rules of conduct are
quite different from those for the ex post adjudication of violations, the latter
being the issue here. If a criminal code is to have any hope of capturing our
complex judgments about mitigation in the adjudication of violations, it
must commonly rely upon subjective and complex standards rather than spe-
cific objective rules.
That truth is reflected in the old common-law formulations that openly
rely upon complex judgments—what exactly constitutes “heat of pas-
sion”?—and is repeatedly shown even more dramatically in a wide variety
of common modern code formulations. How much loss of capacity is
enough for an offender to meet the Model Penal Code’s insanity requirement
that the offender “lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law”?145 (The same open-ended language is used in the Model Penal Code’s
involuntary intoxication excuse.) The Model Penal Code’s duress excuse is
available if “a person of reasonable firmness in [the actor’s] situation would
have been unable to resist.”146 Or consider the Code’s de minimis infraction
defense, which allows a dismissal if the defendant’s violation was “too triv-
ial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.”147 How trivial is too trivial?
143 See IJUD, supra note 4, at 5–34.
144 Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 335, 375–385 (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMI-
NAL LAW 185–209 (1997).
145
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (emphasis added).
146 Id. § 2.09(1) (emphasis added).
147 Id. § 2.12(2).
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In the Model Penal Code’s mitigation of murder to manslaughter, how much
disturbance is enough to satisfy the “extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance” requirement?148
Even the culpability requirements that apply to every offense definition
in the Special Part of the code depend upon the decision-maker’s complex
judgments of justice. For example, a person is reckless with respect to a
material element only if he disregards a “substantial risk” that the element
exists or will result from his conduct.149 How substantial is substantial
enough? Further, the risk must be of such a nature that its disregard involves
“a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation.”150 How much of a deviation is suffi-
ciently gross to constitute recklessness, and how would a law-abiding person
react to the actor’s situation? These and dozens of other code provisions
present decision-makers with open-ended and complex judgments about
what is just in the situation.151
In other words, it is simply impossible for a criminal code to avoid
open-ended standards in judging an offender’s blameworthiness, and any
code that attempts to do so is destined to perform blameworthiness adjudica-
tion badly. What a criminal code can and should do is to tell the decision-
maker the particular factors that he or she should focus upon and provide a
decisional structure that shows the interrelation among those factors. This
gives the decision-maker a way to think about the complex issue. The for-
mulation proposed above provides that general guidance and avoids using
specific objective criteria that could distort the decision-maker’s judgment of
justice.
Further, notice that all of the above examples of existing statutory lan-
guage that use open-ended standards concern higher stakes than the mitiga-
tion provision proposed here. In those examples, the issue is commonly
whether the defendant shall be held criminally liable at all. Under the pro-
posed general mitigation provision suggested here, the only question is
whether an offender held criminally liable shall be entitled to a mitigation of
an offense grade or less.
Even if the mitigation proposal is workable in practice, one may won-
der whether it is politically feasible. As noted previously,152 the Model Penal
Code drafters had limited success in selling their extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance mitigation; it was adopted in only ten American jurisdic-
tions. And the mitigation proposed above is noticeably broader in some
respects in that it would apply beyond the offense of murder. Shouldn’t we
148 Id. § 210.3(1)(b) (emphasis added).
149 Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
150 Id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
151 For other examples see IJUD, supra note 4, at 104–108.
152 See supra note 26.
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assume, then, that it would be even less politically attractive than the Model
Penal Code’s murder mitigation?
While it is true that the proposal potentially applies to more offenses, it
is in some respects narrower than the Model Penal Code’s “extreme mental
or emotional disturbance” murder mitigation, for the proposed mitigation
provides more guidance, and each of its three inquiries provides an indepen-
dent basis for denying the mitigation to undeserving offenders. Further, the
areas in which the proposal is broader than the Model Penal Code are the
areas for which it is easy to see the need for such broadening. As discussed
above,153 there is little rational justification for limiting a mitigation to mur-
der cases. And there are any number of cases in which there is strong com-
munity support for a mitigation even in the absence of “extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.”154
Further, providing a jury with an opportunity to take account of what
they think are mitigating circumstances can avoid their returning a verdict of
acquittal when they are presented with what they see as two bad choices:
convicting an offender for an offense that ignores important mitigating cir-
cumstances or acquitting an offender who deserves some degree of liability
and punishment. For example, as noted previously,155 most American juris-
dictions adopt the all-or-nothing approach to mistake as to justification: a
completely reasonable mistake will provide a defense, while even an honest
but negligent mistake provides no defense or mitigation at all. (Under the
sliding-scale approach of the Model Penal Code, in contrast, an honest but
negligent mistake provides a reduced grade liability—that of a negligent of-
fense.156) Thus, if a police officer shoots and kills a suspect because of an
honest but negligent belief that his life is in danger, the all-or-nothing ap-
proach requires the jury to return either a verdict of unmitigated murder or a
complete acquittal. Given what the jury sees as two bad choices, they will
commonly provide an undeserved acquittal rather than provide an unde-
served conviction for murder. But the general mitigation provision can avoid
the undeserved acquittal by giving the jury an opportunity to impose liability
in a mitigated form that they believe properly distinguishes the case from
one of a straightforward murder.
Critics might easily misunderstand the choice before them in deciding
whether to adopt the proposed mitigation codification. They may assume
that rejecting the provision would avoid mitigations of which they might not
approve, but that is not the choice before them. Absent the mitigation codifi-
cation, the current system will remain in place, in which sentencing judges
have enormous discretion in deciding when and how much mitigation to
give. The problem is, absent some guiding set of principles, such as those in
153 See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.
154 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
155 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 37.
156
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
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the proposed provision, every individual sentencing judge is necessarily left
to make ad hoc and unprincipled judgments.
The assumption that rejecting the mitigation codification will prevent
mitigations also ignores the decision-making choices of trial jurors. As long
as the criminal law ignores the presence of circumstances that jurors see as
crying out for mitigation, some juries will feel morally justified in returning
nullification verdicts. Indeed, as discussed previously, the same kind of diso-
bedience and disrespect can play out among a wide variety of players in the
criminal justice process.157
One obvious problem with leaving deserved mitigations in the hands of
such nullification actors is that they will fail to mitigate in a large percentage
of cases that deserve mitigation. The jurors in the case may choose not to
violate their trial oaths. And other participants in the process, such as wit-
nesses and prosecutors, may not choose to undermine the normal legal pro-
cess for the case at hand.
But a second kind of problem, equally troubling, is the arbitrariness and
unjustified disparity inherent in relying upon a system of judicial discretion
or other parties’ nullification activities. Whether an offender gets the de-
served mitigation will depend upon random events—such as who the deci-
sion-makers in the case are—that have nothing to do with the offense and its
circumstances. Identically-situated offenders may receive significantly dif-
ferent punishments based upon pure chance.158
Such disparity and arbitrariness were once tolerated half a century ago,
when criminal codes, such as the Model Penal Code, had four or five grad-
ing categories that left sentencing judges enormous discretion over the
amount of punishment imposed. But those days have passed. As noted
above, the march of progress has steadily moved decision-making to the
more democratic forums of legislatures and juries, increasingly cabining
judicial discretion: legislatures now sort offenses into a dozen or more dif-
ferent grading categories; sentencing commissions may further narrow sen-
tencing ranges; and juries are increasingly involved in finding the facts and
making the normative judgments that ultimately determine punishment.
Criminal codes and sentencing guidelines have become increasingly
meticulous in parsing the harms and aggravations of each offense, as in the
“telephone book” of the United States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines.
Shouldn’t we have a similar ambition for parsing the nuances of blamewor-
thiness and mitigation? Given today’s expectations, the availability of miti-
157 See the discussion of this similar dynamic played out among variety of participants in
the criminal justice system in ROBINSON & ROBINSON, supra note 63.
158 We know from empirical studies that judges can have dramatically different views
from one another on all manner of sentencing issues. See generally Kevin Clancy et al., Sen-
tence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sen-
tence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524 (1981); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010); Crystal S. Yang,
Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime-Evidence
from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 (2014).
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gations ought to be subject to the guidance of principled codifications
applied to the case at hand by jurors representing the community.
A separate reason to provide such a mitigation codification is to make
trials less deceptive and fanciful. A jury will hear only evidence presented at
trial and, absent a codified general mitigation provision, evidence relating to
such mitigating circumstances commonly will be hidden from the jury. What
jurors will hear is a fantasy version of the case that simply does not represent
what happened in the real world, but rather some legally-distorted version of
the truth.
Some prosecutors may be pleased by the situation, but they ought not
be if they understand its long-term effects in undermining the criminal law’s
moral credibility with the community. Treating criminal adjudication as a
game with rules to be manipulated to maximum advantage by each side,
rather than a quest for truth and justice, inevitably undermines the criminal
justice process as a reliable moral authority.159 Over time, people come to
understand that the system is not committed to doing justice, but rather is
simply playing out its game rules. That loss of credibility ultimately trans-
lates into a loss of crime-control effectiveness, reducing deference and com-
pliance as well as the criminal law’s ability to have people internalize its
norms.160
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It has been argued here that the Model Penal Code amendment setting
blameworthiness proportionality as the dominant distributive principle for
criminal punishment is a desirable and important development.161 Empirical
studies suggest that this is in fact the principle that ordinary people use in
assessing proper punishment. Its adoption as the governing distributive prin-
ciple for criminal liability and punishment makes good sense because it pro-
motes not only the classic desert retributivism of moral philosophers but also
crime-control utilitarianism by enhancing the criminal law’s moral credibil-
ity with the community and thereby promoting deference, compliance, ac-
quiescence, and internalization of its norms instead of suffering the
resistance and subversion that is provoked by perceived violations of blame-
worthiness proportionality.
Such a principle has been commonly used as the basis for criticizing
improper aggravations, such as the doctrines of felony murder and “three
159 The problem is not solved by reliance upon judicial discretion. The studies show that
individual judges commonly have views on mitigation in individual cases that vary dramati-
cally from the views of the community. See Robinson, Jackowitz, & Bartels, supra note 84.
See also various cases of sentencing discretion producing results in conflict with subjects’
views: Gridine, see supra note 32; Kravchenko, see supra note 48; Rambold, see supra note
49–50.
160 See generally IJUD, supra note 4, at 141–188.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
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strikes.” But the principle also logically requires recognizing a full range of
deserved mitigations, not as a matter of grace or forgiveness but as a matter
of entitlement. And, given ordinary people’s nuanced judgments about
blameworthiness proportionality, maintaining moral credibility with the
community requires the criminal law to adopt an equally nuanced system of
mitigations.
Such a nuanced system ideally would include reform of a wide variety
of current law doctrines and, especially in the absence of such specific re-
forms, adoption of a general mitigation provision that aims for blameworthi-
ness proportionality in all cases. Such a general mitigation ought not be
limited to cases of “heat of passion” or murder as today’s liability rules
commonly provide. It ought to be available whenever the offense circum-
stances and the offender’s situation and capacities meaningfully reduce the
offender’s blameworthiness, as long as giving the mitigation does not spe-
cially undermine community norms.
Adopting a codified general mitigation provision can provide blame-
worthiness proportionality more consistently, accurately, democratically,
and transparently than leaving the mitigation to the unguided exercise of
discretion by individual sentencing judges.
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